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ARTICLES
WARRANTS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
Barry Jeffrey Stern*
INTRODUCTION
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment as permitting war-
rants to be issued without probable cause would strike many
as its ultimate perversion.' Although the Constitution is not
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A.,
University of Michigan, 1971; J.D., University of Michigan, 1975. The author
completed this Article while he was a visiting professor at McGeorge School of
Law.
The author wishes to thank Professor Jerold H. Israel for reviewing and
commenting on an earlier draft of this Article. The valuable research assistance of
McGeorge School of Law student Robert Schwartz in the preparation of this
Article is gratefully acknowledged.
' See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment,
45 U. PITr. L. REV. 227, 251 (1984) ("endorsing use of the warrant procedure
when probable cause is lacking would be inconsistent" with the Warrant Clause);
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1496 (1985) ("[S]earches that are not based on probable cause could not be subject
to a warrant requirement unless the Constitution... were amended."); id. at
1496 n.122 (concluding that the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court "did, in ef-
fect, amend the Constitution" by authorizing "administrative warrants issued upon
'area probable cause"). But see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
10.10(d), at 28 (2d ed. 1987) (Court's conclusion in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987), that there is a constitutional bar against warrants unsupported by
probable cause is "far from convincing"); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
383, 414-25, 426 & n.135 (1988) (proposing a "composite model" for Fourth Amend-
ment analysis involving initiatory and responsive police intrusions; initiatory intru-
sions are investigations undertaken in the absence of suspicious behavior, which do
not require probable cause and are analyzed under the unreasonable search and
seizure clause; proposed model allows a court to "decide that the only valid way
for an initiatory intrusion to proceed would be to obtain prior judicial approval");
H. Richard Uvilier, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsid-
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specific about most things, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment contains what appears to be a clear prohibition:
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."2 Yet, in
Camara v. Municipal Court,3 the Supreme Court interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to authorize administrative search
warrants unsupported by the traditional definition of probable
cause. Moreover, in both Davis v. Mississippi4 and Hayes v.
Florida,5 the Court suggested that a warrant could authorize
the seizure of a person without probable cause to arrest.6 Sim-
ilarly, in Griffin v. Wisconsin,' Justice Blackmun, joined in
dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan, argued that a war-
rant to search a probationer's house could issue upon reason-
able suspicion rather than the more demanding standard of
probable cause.'
In response to the Griffin dissent, Justice Scalia, writing
for a five member majority of the Court, directly challenged the
assumption that the Fourth Amendment can be interpreted to
authorize warrants without the traditional definition of proba-
ble cause. Justice Scalia concluded that a judicial warrant9
eration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1137,
1210 (1987) (proposing that a reasonable suspicion standard support surveillance
orders for semi-secure behavior; Professor Uviller concludes that '[als the adminis-
trative search warrant illustrates, we need not be hidebound in devising judicial
orders to satisfy . . . the Fourth Amendment; a little imagination is welcomed by
the Constitution in the pursuit of its purposes, correctly understood").
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For a comprehensive discussion of the issues raised by
Camara, see Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
4 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
470 U.S. 811 (1985).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 131-40 (discussing Hayes and Davis).
7 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
8 Id. at 881-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
' In Griffin, Justice Scalia distinguished between judicial warrants and admin-
istrative warrants. Administrative warrants can be issued by executive and judicial
officers, while judicial warrants presumably can be issued only by judicial officers.
See infra text accompanying notes 75-79. This Article uses the term warrant to
refer to both judicial and administrative warrants. The terms "judicial warrant"
and "administrative warrant" are used when necessary to highlight Justice Scalia's
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requirement for a search that does not require traditional
probable cause would violate the text of the Warrant Clause
and be inconsistent with the Court's Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.10
Justice Scalia's reliance on the plain meaning of the
Fourth Amendment in Griffin is not surprising since it is con-
sistent with his general approach to statutory and constitution-
al interpretation." What is initially surprising about Griffin,
however, is that justices closely associated with expansively
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy inter-
ests argued in favor of a warrant unsupported by probable
cause. 2 If a warrant issued without probable cause sanctions
distinction between the two types of warrants.
1 Justice Scalia concludes that a judicial warrant unsupported by probable
cause
is a combination that neither the text of the Constitution nor any of our
prior decisions permits. While it is possible to say that Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness demands probable cause without a judicial warrant,
the reverse runs up against the constitutional provision that "no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia was joined in his opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor. Id. at 869.
Although Justice Scalia argues that his interpretation is consistent with prece-
dent, only one decision that he cited, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959),
concludes that it is unconstitutional to impose a warrant requirement on a search
that does not require traditional probable cause. Frank, however, was overruled by
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), which allows warrants to be
issued by judicial officers without traditional probable cause. See infra text accom-
panying notes 21-39 & 104-09.
Although Griffin is the first case in which the Court interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to prohibit a warrant requirement for searches that do not require
probable cause, it was asked to reach that conclusion several years earlier. See
United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 554-55 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
"' See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (rejecting defendant's
contention that he was subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure when a police
officer chasing him commanded him to stop; "The language of the Fourth
Amendment, of course, cannot sustain respondent's contention. The word 'seizure'
readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force
to restrain movement .. . ."); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) ("[T]he
irreducible literal meaning of the [Confrontation] Clause ... [is] 'a right to meet
face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.') (citations omitted);
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]f the
language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect-at least in the
absence of a patent absurdity."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650-56 (1990); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989).
" See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
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searches and seizures based upon an inappropriately low level
of suspicion, it is indeed perplexing how Justices Marshall and
Brennan could have been among its proponents. The Griffin
dissenters, however, do not propose a warrant requirement to
authorize a search or seizure upon an inappropriately low level
of suspicion, a use that this Article refers to as an "offensive"
use of a warrant. Instead, they favor a warrant requirement to
control the discretion of an officer conducting a search or sei-
zure properly authorized on less than probable cause, a use
that this Article refers to as a "defensive" use of a warrant.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, concludes that this defensive
use is prohibited by the text of the Fourth Amendment and
precedent. Moreover, he cautions that the Griffin dissenters
have not considered the "implications" of their warrant propos-
al "for the body of Fourth Amendment law."13 Although the
point of this observation is somewhat cryptic, perhaps Justice
Scalia is suggesting that an interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment that would authorize a warrant requirement in
Griffin is more likely to result in warrants being used offen-
sively rather than defensively.
This Article examines the related issues of whether the
Fourth Amendment can and should be interpreted to authorize
warrants unsupported by the traditional definition of probable
cause. This Article is divided into four parts. Part I explores
the interpretive theory of the Fourth Amendment applied in
Camara, which relies upon the unreasonable search and sei-
zure clause to vary the probable cause requirement. A variable
standard of probable cause can authorize a warrant require-
ment for any reasonable search or seizure, whether or not
supported by the traditional definition of probable cause.
The second part of this Article examines Justice Scalia's
plain meaning interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Griffin. 4 Justice Scalia contends that this interpretation is
compelled by the text of the Amendment and is consistent with
its precedent. The Amendment's text, however, is not disposi-
Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
'3 Id. at 878.
"' Although courts frequently claim that interpretation is not involved in a
decision applying the plain meaning rule, interpretation is inherent in any applica-
tion of the rule. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 46.02, at 91-92 (5th ed. 1992).
1388 [Vol. 59: 1385
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rive of whether a warrant requirement can be imposed in Grif-
fin, and Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Amendment im-
plicitly challenges the legitimacy of Camara. Moreover, under
Justice Scalia's interpretation, the presumption that warrant-
less searches are unconstitutional15 is radically altered: the
constitutionality of a search that is reasonable without proba-
ble cause depends on the absence, rather than the presence, of
a warrant requirement.
The third part of this Article discusses two interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment that can authorize defensive use of
warrants even if Camara's variable standard of probable cause
is overruled. The Article concludes by considering whether
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to authorize warrants
without probable cause is more likely to erode, rather than
protect, Fourth Amendment values.
I. CAMARA AND VARIABLE PROBABLE CAUSE
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not
define probable cause, the framers' concept was one of particu-
larized suspicion; that is, suspicion must focus on a specific
person, place or thing. The importance of particularized suspi-
cion to the framers derived from their hatred of general war-
rants, which issued without particularized suspicion," as well
"5 "[lit is settled . . . that 'except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
720 (1987) (quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968) (quoting Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967))). "Thus the most basic constitu-
tional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted ... without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also United States v. United States
Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) ("Prior
review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuat-
ing Fourth Amendment rights."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969)
("Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magis-
trate between the citizen and the police.") (quoting McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[T]he police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure."). But see infra note 181 (discussing whether the
presumption exists in name only).
16 The importance of general warrants in fomenting the Revolution has been
1994] 1389
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described by the Court in the following manner:
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those
general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the
Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had
given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for
goods imported in violation of British tax laws. They were denounced by
James Otis as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most de-
structive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book," because they placed "the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer." The historic occasion of
that denunciation, in 1761 at Boston, has been characterized as "perhaps
the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colo-
nies to the oppressions of the mother country. 'Then and there', said
John Adams, 'then and there was the first scene of the first act of oppo-
sition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born."'
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980) (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965);
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-66 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886).
An example of the scope of authority allowed under a writ appears in the
Paxton writ, which was issued in Massachusetts in 1755. That writ allowed all
subjects to
from Time to time at his or their Will as well in the day as in the
Night to enter and go on board any Ship, Boat, or other Vessel riding
lying or being within or coming to said port ... to View & Search &
strictly to examine in the same, touching the customs and Subsidies to
us due, And also in the day Time together with a Constable or other
public officer . .. to enter and go into any Vaults, Cellars, Warehouse,
Shops or other Places to search and see whether any Goods, Wares or
Merchandise [were illegally concealed]; and to open any Trunks, Chests,
Boxes, Fardells or Packs made up or in Bulk [in which such goods] are
suspected to be packed or concealed.
JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS, App. I, at 404-05 (1865). Although
writs of assistance are referred to as general warrants, the writs differed from
general warrants in several respects. A writ authorized Crown officers to search
for uncustomed goods based upon their own suspicions. General warrants allowed
searches and seizures in connection with specific instances of wrongdoing. Thus,
while both a writ and a general warrant failed to specify the place to be searched
and things to be seized, a writ provided even more discretion to the officer since a
search under it did not have to be connected to a specific instance of misconduct.
See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 (The Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science Series LV, No. 2, 1937). Moreover, a
general warrant expired upon its execution, while a writ of assistance provided
authority to search throughout the reign of the sovereign. 0. M. Dickerson, Writs
of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVO-
LUTION 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939). For a comprehensive discussion of the
general warrants and their impact on the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-45
1390 [Vol. 59: 1385
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as the language of the Warrant Clause itself, which requires
warrants to "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."' It is therefore not
surprising that the Court has held that probable cause gener-
ally requires particularized suspicion.' The one exception is
in the case of an administrative search. In this instance, proba-
ble cause does not refer to particularized suspicion, "but mere-
ly to a requirement of reasonableness." 9 The use of a variable
reasonableness standard to define probable cause can be traced
to Camara v. Municipal Court."
A. Camara v. Municipal Court
In Camara, the Court held that warrantless, non-consen-
sual searches for housing code violations were unconstitution-
al. The searches, however, could proceed if authorized by a
warrant and supported by probable cause.2' The type of prob-
able cause for a Camara warrant, however, radically differs
from that ordinarily required for a search. Suspicion that a
particular building violates the housing code is not required.
Instead, probable cause exists when a search is undertaken
pursuant to "reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection."22 Those standards can be
based on neutral criteria, including the time between inspec-
tions, the type of building to be inspected and the condition of
the area.23
Although Camara abandoned the traditional definition of
probable cause to authorize housing inspections, the Court did
not dispense with a warrant requirement. Instead, it relied
upon the Fourth Amendment's "one governing principle" that
(1966); LASSON, supra, at 51-78.
17 U.S. CONST. amend IV, supra note 2.
1" See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ("Where the standard is prob-
able cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause
particularized with respect to that person."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 560 (1970) ('[S]ome quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a
prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.").
" Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987).
2' 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
21 Id. at 539-40.




"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' un-
less it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."24 The
Court then cited several reasons why housing inspections
should not be an exception to that principle.
Without a warrant requirement, the decision to search
would be left solely to the officer's discretion." That authori-
ty, the Court emphasized, "is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a
requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to
search."26 Prior judicial authorization was especially neces-
sary because the inspections invade the "sanctity of [the]
home,"27 and a warrant reassures the homeowner that the
inspector is acting lawfully. Moreover, a warrant require-
ment would not defeat the public interests furthered by the
inspections. The inspections, therefore, would be subject to a
warrant requirement with a magistrate determining whether
the inspections were undertaken pursuant to a neutral plan.3 °
Three justices vigorously dissented in Camara and argued
that the search was reasonable without a warrant. The dis-
senters disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a warrant
protects privacy interests and argued that the decision "prosti-
tutes" the Warrant Clause.3  They characterized the
magistrate's function in issuing a Camara warrant as that of
being a "rubber stamp."32 That Camara would split the Court
24 Id. at 528-29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 532.
28 Id. at 532-33.
2 Id. at 531.
28 Id. at 532; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (war-
rant requirement assures subject of search of the lawfulness of the officer's con-
duct); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) ("[A] major function of the war-
rant is to provide the property owner with sufficient information to reassure him
of the entry's legality.").
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
30 Id. at 547. The Court anticipated, however, that in most instances the in-
spectors would obtain the homeowner's consent and avoid the need for obtaining a
warrant. Id. at 539-40.
31 Id. at 546 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justices Harlan and Stewart joined Jus-
tice Clark's dissent.
' Id. at 547-48. For a discussion of the appropriate role of a magistrate in
issuing a Camara warrant, see LaFave, supra note 3, at 23-27. See also Mosher
Steel-Virginia v. Teig, 327 S.E.2d 87, 94 (Va. 1985) ("The warrant-issuing official
must be given sufficient details by which to test the reasonableness of the decision
1392 [Vol. 59:1385
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is not surprising. Just eight years earlier, a sharply divided
Court in Frank v. Maryland33 upheld the constitutionality of
warrantless housing inspections.34
Writing for a five-member majority in Frank, Justice
Frankfurter rejected the argument of the dissenters that a
warrant requirement, identical to the one eventually adopted
in Camara, should be imposed on the inspections.35 Justice
Frankfurter derisively referred to the warrant proposal as "a
synthetic search warrant" and concluded that "[i]f a warrant be
constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly
interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restric-
tions for its issue."3 Justice Frankfurter's concept of probable
cause was therefore one of particularized suspicion, which by
definition is lacking when inspections are authorized pursuant
to a routine plan. Consequently, the imposition of a warrant
requirement on such inspections would consequently violate
the Warrant Clause.
In overruling Frank, the Court in Camara sought to fore-
close Justice Frankfurter's argument that there is a constitu-
tional bar against imposing a warrant requirement without
particularized suspicion. Rather than accept Justice
Frankfurter's premise that probable cause always requires
to inspect."); City of Seattle v. Leach, 627 P.2d 159, 161-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
(noting that the documents submitted in support of an administrative warrant did
not describe the inspection program in sufficient detail, thus preventing the magis-
trate from being able to determine whether the inspection plan was reasonable).
33 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
" In Frank, the Court reasoned that inspections to detect housing code viola-
tions "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by
the Fourteenth Amendments protection against official intrusion." Id. at 367. The
Court concluded that a warrant requirement would cripple the effectiveness of the
inspection programs and was unnecessary to establish their reasonableness. Id. at
372.
The Court analyzed the search in Frank under both the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments. This is probably best explained by the fact that whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to the states had not yet been settled. See Sundby,
supra note 1, at 389-90 & n.17.
" Justice Douglas, writing the dissent in Frank and joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Brennan, argued that "[tihe test of 'probable cause'
required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search
that is being sought" and noted that "[tihe passage of a certain period without
inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance
of a warrant." Frank, 359 U.S. at 374, 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 373.
1994] 1393
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particularized suspicion, Camara expanded the concept of
probable cause. This was done by applying an interpretive
theory of the Fourth Amendment that relies upon the unrea-
sonable search and seizure clause to define the meaning of
probable cause in the Warrant Clause.
" The relevance of the Fourth Amendments congressional history to interpre-
tive theories that place significance on the fact that the Fourth Amendment has
two clauses is a fascinating issue.
Professor Lasson has concluded that "[t]he most interesting thing about the
passage of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution . . . is that the House
seems never to have consciously agreed to the Amendment in its present form."
LASSON, supra note 16, at 101. The text of the Amendment debated and approved
by the House of Representatives contained a single clause aimed at preventing the
abuses associated with general warrants: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issu-
ing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
A proposal to change the Amendment to its present form and, thereby, sepa-
rately protect the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
defeated by the House. Despite the defeat, the committee responsible for arranging
the Bill of Rights reported the Amendment to the House in the form that the
House had earlier rejected. The committee's error was not noticed by the House,
and the reported Amendment was eventually approved by Congress and the states.
Whether the committee's error was an honest mistake or an intentional attempt to
ignore the first House vote rejecting a two-clause amendment has never been de-
termined. It is interesting to note, however, that the committee's chair, Represen-
tative Benson, was the author of the two-clause amendment first defeated by the
House. Id. at 101.
This inauspicious birth of a two-clause amendment, however, should have
little impact on its interpretation. Whether or not the House originally intended
the Amendment to have two clauses, it eventually adopted the Amendment in the
form that Representative Benson had proposed. Moreover, by initially rejecting a
two-clause amendment, the House was not necessarily expressing its view that the
one-clause amendment only prohibited general warrants but failed to protect the
broader right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Instead, an
equally plausible explanation is that the House viewed the one-clause amendment
as broad enough to protect the general right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures since it specified one way that right could be violated. Id. at 101-02.
Representative Benson may well have feared that the original one-clause
amendment failed to protect adequately the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. In support of his proposal, Benson argued that the one-
clause amendment "was good as far as it went, [but he thought] it was not suffi-
cient." Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted). However, Benson's fears about the limited
scope of a one-clause amendment did not necessarily reflect the House's intent
when it rejected his proposal. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights
Act, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985) (pitfall in statutory interpretation is to
rely on legislative arguments against a bill's enactment as evidence of the
legislature's intent in enacting law). But while the history surrounding the
Amendments adoption does not weaken interpretations that rely upon the exis-
tence of two clauses, it does illustrate how precarious constitutional interpretive
1394 [Vol. 59:1385
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Camara concluded that housing inspections pursuant to a
neutral plan further important governmental interests that
outweigh the privacy interests of the buildings' owners. The
inspections were, therefore, reasonable searches under the
Amendment's first clause.3" This determination of reasonable-
ness was simultaneously used to establish probable cause for a
warrant under the Amendment's second clause, with the Court
concluding that "[i]f a valid public interest justifies the intru-
sion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a
suitably restricted search warrant."39
B. Limiting Variable Probable Cause to Administrative
Searches
If probable cause is flexible enough to authorize searches
without particularized suspicion, then perhaps it is also flexi-
ble enough to vary the quantum of suspicion for searches and
seizures that require particularized suspicion. For example, a
warrant to search a warehouse for a narcotics might issue
upon a lesser degree of suspicion than one to search a dwelling
for gambling devices. A search in the narcotics case arguably
implicates higher societal interests and lower privacy interests
than a search in the gambling case because of the seriousness
of the crime and the type of place to be searched." Applying
Camara's methodology, the public interest in combatting drugs
could permit a less demanding standard of particularized sus-
picion to establish probable cause for a warrant.4'
arguments that rely upon the framers' "original intent" can sometimes be. See also
infra note 58 (authorities discussing the significance of "original intent" in consti-
tutional interpretation).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).
3' Id. at 539.
O See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (proposed variable standard of probable cause dependent on type of crime
involved). For arguments in favor of a variable standard of probable cause, see
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 243-56. See also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and
Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
465, 501-06 (1984). For arguments against a variable standard, see Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393-94,
415 (1974). See also infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
4 While Camara did not require particularized suspicion to establish probable
cause for the housing inspections, the Court stressed that such suspicion was nec-
essary for criminal investigatory searches.
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In Terry v. Ohio, decided one year after Camara, the Court
had an opportunity to apply variable probable cause to a
search requiring particularized suspicion.42 The Court in Ter-
ry upheld a limited weapons search of a suspected armed rob-
ber without probable cause to arrest. If the Court had analyzed
the search under the interpretative theory of the Fourth
Amendment it had applied in Camara, it could have held that
the officer's conduct was reasonable under the Amendment's
first clause and, therefore, supported by probable cause. Unlike
Camara, where no exigency justified dispensing with a war-
rant, the need for immediate action to protect the officer in
Terry would have excused compliance with the warrant re-
quirement.4"
But the Terry Court applied only a portion of its Camara
analysis. Although it balanced the competing interests impli-
cated by the search to uphold its reasonableness, it also as-
sumed the nonexistence of probable cause. The unreasonable
search and seizure clause thus took on independent signifi-
cance to uphold a warrantless search on less than probable
cause. The stage was now set for the Court to authorize a wide
range of warrantless searches and seizures without probable
cause.
44
Following Terry, the Court has followed two inconsistent
approaches to defining probable cause. On the one hand, it has
rejected a "multifactor balancing test" of probable cause,
stressing instead the need for "[a] single, familiar standard...
to guide police officers who have only limited time and experi-
ence to reflect and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront."45 Conse-
[1un a criminal investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific
stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would hardly justify
a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these
goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with
a warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable cause" to believe
that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
42 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1' See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 54-56 (1968).
41 See infra note 62.
"' Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). In Dunaway, New York
urged the Court "to adopt a multifactor balancing test of 'reasonable police conduct
under the circumstances' to analyze seizures that do not amount to technical ar-
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quently, the Court has created a reduced degree of particular-
ized suspicion-reasonable suspicion 4 -and applies that stan-
dard under the unreasonable search and seizure clause to
uphold criminal investigatory searches and seizures unsupport-
ed by probable cause." On the other hand, the Court has re-
affirmed Camara and has used variable probable cause to im-
pose a warrant requirement in the absence of particularized
suspicion. 4' The Court, however, only applies variable proba-
ble cause to administrative searches.49
Unlike criminal investigatory searches, administrative
searches are conducted pursuant to regulatory schemes de-
rests." Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). The Court declined, concluding that
[tihe familiar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth Amend-
ment seizures . . . provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary
to the implementation of a workable rule.
... [T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too easily
disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circum-
stances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may
be done in the first instance by police officers engaged in the "often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." A single, familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and exper-
tise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interest involved
in the specific circumstances they confront.
Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
46 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987) (contrasting the quan-
tum of evidence establishing traditional probable cause "from a lesser quantum
such as 'reasonable suspicion"').
4' See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) ("if police have
a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person
they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felo-
ny, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion"); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (temporary seizure of luggage may be justified
based upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing not amounting to probable cause).
S Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (warrantless inspections
to determine OSHA violations are unconstitutional; inspections can proceed if au-
thorized by administrative warrant supported by probable cause based on "reason-
able legislative or administrative [inspection] standards"); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (warrantless fire inspections of buildings held unconstitu-
tional but can be authorized by administrative warrant with probable cause deter-
mined "against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the
public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved"); see
also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283-85 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("area" warrant might serve as substitute for particularized probable
cause to support searches by roving border patrols).
" "In the administrative search context, we formally require that administra-
tive warrants be supported by 'probable cause,' because in that context we use
that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement
of reasonableness." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 n.4.
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signed to further specific societal objectives, such as to promote
safe work places or to assure that a closely regulated industry
is operated properly." Although both criminal and adminis-
trative searches may be aimed at enforcing criminal sanctions,
an administrative search is undertaken as one aspect of broad-
er governmental regulation of a problem.51 The Court, howev-
er, has never explained why the standard of probable cause
can only be varied for administrative searches, nor has it ap-
plied variable probable cause consistently to all searches that
could be characterized as administrative.52
'o See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1986); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981); Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307 (OSHA inspections); see also Peter S.
Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1011,
1016 (1973) ("The phrase 'administrative search' encompasses governmental investi-
gatory intrusions that are not the traditional searches for criminal evidence; there
is no single type of 'administrative search.").
"' Before Burger, the Court drew a distinction between administrative and ordi-
nary searches in that an administrative search could not be undertaken solely to
investigate criminal activity. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1984)
(distinction between administrative and other search warrants for fire scene de-
pends on whether object of search is criminal); Donovan, 452 U.S. at 598 (when
commercial property is searched for criminal evidence, a warrant based upon prob-
able cause is necessary); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) (probable
cause standard applies if evidence sought is to be used in a criminal prosecution).
In Burger, the Court upheld an administrative search uncovering criminal
evidence, which was undertaken pursuant to a general regulatory scheme. The
Court stated that "[tihe discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an other-
wise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the
administrative scheme suspect." Burger, 482 U.S. at 716. Justice Brennan's dissent
criticized the majority for ignoring the distinction between searches for adminis-
trative as opposed to criminal violations. "The [Clourt, thus, implicitly holds that if
an administrative scheme has certain goals and if the search serves those goals, it
may be upheld even if no concrete administrative consequences could follow from a
particular search." Id. at 728 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite Justice Brennan's
criticism, it should be noted that the Court in Burger appeared to assume that an
administrative search undertaken as a pretext to uncover criminal evidence would
be unconstitutional. See id. at 716-17 n.27; see also Gregory E. Birkenstock, The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of Probable Cause: An Alterna-
tive Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 858 (1992) ("Even if an administrative search can
be expected to uncover evidence of crimes, the search is still evaluated by the
diminished administrative search standards unless there is evidence that the regu-
latory scheme is a pretext for a search aimed at criminal law enforcement."); Pro-
ject, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals, 1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1029 (1992) ("[t]he
presence of both administrative and investigative purposes . . .will not invalidate
an otherwise lawful administrative search, provided that the administrative pur-
pose is dominant").
52 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
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C. Camara Reconsidered
The contrasts between the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Camara are striking, and they implicate the fundamen-
tal meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment. For the
majority, probable cause is a flexible standard that varies
depending on the competing privacy and societal interests
raised by a particular search; for the dissenters, probable cause
always requires particularized suspicion. For the majority,
Fourth Amendment values are furthered by imposing a war-
rant requirement on searches for housing code violations; for
the dissenters, a warrant requirement diminishes Fourth
Amendment protection. Both perspectives are supported by the
text of the Amendment and the history surrounding its adop-
tion.
Implicit in the framers' conception of probable cause was
the requirement of particularized suspicion.53 Camara's refor-
mulation of probable cause to allow warrants to issue without
particularized suspicion, therefore, can be criticized as sanc-
tioning the same type of general warrant that led to the
Amendment's adoption.54 Thus, through its redefinition of
(1989) (upholding Customs Agency's plan to implement drug testing of specified
classes of employees without a warrant or individualized suspicion). The Court
emphasized that "the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in
analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions," but the Court
did not apply variable probable cause in upholding the drug testing program. Id.
at 668.
The search in Griffin also could have been analyzed under the administrative
search doctrine as it had been undertaken pursuant to a statutory scheme regulat-
ing the conditions of probation. See infra text accompanying notes 64-65. The fact
that the search was undertaken in part by police officers and led to the institution
of criminal charges against Griffin does not prevent analysis of the search under
the administrative search doctrine. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717-18.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
' Dissenting from the imposition of a warrant requirement on OSHA searches
undertaken without particularized suspicion, Justice Stevens equated administra-
tive warrants with the general warrants condemned by the framers:
Since the general warrant, not the warrantless search, was the immedi-
ate evil at which the Fourth Amendment was directed, it is not surpris-
ing that the Framers placed precise limits on its issuance. The require-
ment that a warrant only issue on a showing of particularized probable
cause was the means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power. . .. If
the Court were correct in its view that . . [searches without particular-
ized suspicion], if undertaken without a warrant, are unreasonable in the
constitutional sense, the issuance of a 'new-fangled warrant' . . . without
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probable cause, Camara has been characterized as avoiding
the specific commands of the Warrant Clause by authorizing "a
new-fangled 'warrant' system that is entirely foreign to Fourth
Amendment standards."5
On the other hand, although the Fourth Amendment was
adopted in response to the abuses associated with general
warrants, it does not necessarily follow that its framers would
have equated a Camara warrant with the warrants they con-
demned. While both Camara warrants and general warrants
issue without particularized suspicion, the purpose of a
Camara warrant is to eliminate the executing officer's discre-
tion. The purpose of a colonial general warrant was to sanction
the officer's unbridled discretion. A Camara warrant is used
defensively: when a search is appropriately authorized without
probable cause it eliminates discretion by ensuring that the
decision to invade privacy is undertaken pursuant to criteria
beyond the officer's control. Colonial general warrants did
exactly the opposite and were used offensively: they provided
the officers with the authority to search at their whim.
In prohibiting general warrants in the Warrant Clause,
any true showing of particularized probable cause would not be sufficient
to validate them.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 328 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Silas Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 25-26 (1988) (citing the administrative search cas-
es, the authors comment that the Court, "in a stunning reversal of the text and
history from which [the Fourth Amendment] emerged, has held that in certain
contexts, the Fourth Amendment actually requires general warrants that demon-
strate the absence of particularity and probable cause"). Professor Bookspan has
commented on the irony of the Court upholding administrative warrants unsup-
ported by particularized suspicion:
Historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment may amount to nothing
more than speculation. When we speak of the Framer's intent, we must
acknowledge that they surely were not all of one mind. Nevertheless, it
seems rather apparent that administrative searches were the violations
with which the Framers were intimately familiar and primarily concerned
at the time of the drafting. Intrusions by King George's roving patrols,
authorized by the writs of assistance to look for administrative violations
of the tax and customs rules, were the very searches against which the
colonists were reacting. It is, thus, most ironic that modern interpretation
reduces Fourth Amendment protections in just the situation that we most
clearly can trace back to its origin.
Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 507 n.178 (1991).
"' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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the framers could not have intended the unreasonable search
and seizure clause to authorize the same general searches if
conducted without a warrant. That result would have made the
Fourth Amendment a paper tiger in eliminating the abuses
associated with general warrants: warranted searches without
particularized suspicion would be prohibited, while warrantless
searches would be allowed. Indeed, it was colonial opposition to
warrantless customs searches that led to their authorization by
the writs.56 The searches sanctioned by the colonial general
warrants were unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional,
whether or not conducted pursuant to a warrant, because the
decision to invade privacy was within the sole discretion of the
officer. But while the framers considered customs searches
without particularized suspicion unreasonable, it is uncertain
how they viewed the type of searches authorized by Camara.
Searches to protect the public health and safety undertaken
pursuant to neutral criteria may have been viewed as constitu-
tionally reasonable although not supported by the framers'
concept of probable cause."
LANDYNSKI, supra note 16, at 31-32.
s, In Frank, Justice Frankfurter cited several state statutes that authorized
warrantless health and welfare inspections before adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367-71 (1959), overruled by Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The statutes led Justice Frankfurter to
conclude that "[i]nspection without a warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory
scheme for the general welfare of the community and not as a means of enforcing
the criminal law, has antecedents deep in our history." Frank, 359 U.S. at 367.
In overruling Frank, the Court in Camara did not require the inspections to
be undertaken pursuant to particularized suspicion, relying in part on Frank's
conclusion that such programs "have a long history of judicial and public accep-
tance." Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. In imposing a warrant requirement, however,
Camara did not address Justice Frankfurter's argument in Frank that the inspec-
tion programs with a long history of acceptance authorized warrantless inspections.
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the significance of warrantless
health and safety inspections in determining the framers' "original intent" was
problematic. At least five interpretations are possible. First, the framers may have
approved of the warrantless inspections as reasonable searches. Second, they may
have approved of the warrantless inspections only if supported by traditional prob-
able cause. Third, they may have approved of the inspections only if supported by
traditional probable cause and a warrant. Fourth, they may have approved of the
inspections if supported by neutral inspection criteria and authorized by a war-
rant. Fifth, and most likely, the framers may have never thought about the issue
and, thus, had no intent one way or the other. There is no indication in the pre-
constitutional history as to which of these five possibilities accurately reflects the
framers' intent, or lack thereof.
Arguably, the third possible interpretation of the framers' intent is best sup-
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Significantly, the pre-constitutional history does not estab-
lish that the framers intended the Fourth Amendment to pre-
clude a warrant requirement for searches and seizures that are
constitutionally reasonable but not supported by the tradition-
al definition of probable cause.5" Since the term probable
cause is not self-defining, and since the Amendment contains a
general prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, the framers may have intended the definition of prob-
able cause to be determined by evolving standards of reason-
ableness, even though their concept of probable cause required
particularized suspicion. This view of the framers' intent sup-
ports the decision in Camara. More likely, however, the fram-
ers had no specific intent on how the two clauses should relate
to each other or whether a variable standard should define
probable cause.59 In any event, it is highly unlikely that they
envisioned or intended the Amendment to preclude the imposi-
tion of a warrant requirement on searches and seizures that
are constitutionally reasonable but not supported by the
Court's definition of traditional probable cause. An absolute
prohibition on the use of warrants in this instance would have
been intolerable to the framers whose purpose in adopting the
Fourth Amendment was to protect against the invasion of
privacy by executive officers acting with unbridled discretion.'
ported by the text and the purpose of the Amendment: it retains the framers'
original understanding of probable cause and furthers the Amendment's preference
for advance judicial approval of searches. On the other hand, the framers may
have intended the unreasonable search and seizure clause to apply to the issue
and result in either the first, second or third alternatives. Of course, if the fram-
ers intended either the second or the third alternatives, and the framers' original
intent should be decisive in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, both
Camara and Frank were wrongly decided, as neither decision required particular-
ized suspicion as a prerequisite for a search.
" For the argument that the framers' original intent is inaccessible, or if as-
certainable, should not be of primary significance in constitutional interpretation,
see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism;
Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977-78); Thomas C. Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Terrance Sandalow,
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); John C. Wofford, The
Binding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 502 (1964). But see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977).
' See supra note 37.
60 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) ("The basic purpose of
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Indeed, relying upon the unreasonable search and seizure
clause to vary the standard of probable cause allows the Court
to use warrants defensively for any reasonable search and
seizure. Under this approach, it would be irrelevant whether a
search is characterized as "administrative" or "criminal investi-
gatory," whether it is supported by particularized suspicion or
undertaken pursuant to a neutral inspection plan or whether it
is supported by traditional probable cause or merely reason-
able suspicion.
Camara is written, however, as if the determination that a
search or seizure is reasonable had always been the test for
probable cause. In fact, variable probable cause was a signifi-
cant departure from precedent. The Court's failure to acknowl-
edge that it was redefining probable cause deprives Camara of
some of its legitimacy and may partially explain the Court's
reluctance to apply a variable standard of probable cause to
other searches and seizures. The irony of Camara is that one
of the Court's leading decisions emphasizing the importance of
the warrant requirement in furthering the underlying purpose
of the Amendment is itself vulnerable to the objection of being
inconsistent with the Amendment's underlying principles.
[the Fourth Amendment], as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of
governmental officials.") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 527
(1967)).
Professor Amsterdam concludes that the Amendment was adopted to prevent
indiscriminate searches and seizures, which are objectionable for two reasons:
The first is that they expose people and their possessions to interferences
by government when there is no good reason to do so. The concern here
is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the principle
that every citizen is entitled to security of his person and property un-
less and until an adequate justification for disturbing that security is
shown. The second is that indiscriminate searches and seizures are con-
ducted at the discretion of the executive officials, who may act despotical-
ly and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This
latter concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it condemns
the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers.
Although conceptually severable, these two concerns are indissolubly
linked throughout the preconstitutional history ....
Amsterdam, supra note 40, at 411 (footnote omitted).
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II. GRIFFIN AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEFENSIVE USE OF
WARRANTS
Griffin v. Wisconsin is one of a growing number of cases
upholding warrantless searches and seizures without probable
cause.6 Many have criticized the Court's increasing tendency
to apply a balancing test under the unreasonable search and
seizure clause to dispense with the warrant and probable cause
requirements.62 The question that divided the Court in Grif-
fin, however, was not whether it was reasonable to dispense
with the probable cause requirement. All justices agreed that it
was. Instead, Griffin raises the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment precludes defensive use of warrants when a non-
administrative search or seizure is authorized without tradi-
tional probable cause. In concluding that it does, the Court in
Griffin implicitly suggests that Camara was wrongly decided.
1 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (police
officers may conduct warrantless stops of automobiles without probable cause pur-
suant to non-discretionary scheme to detect drivers under the influence of intoxi-
cants); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (government employers and super-
visors may conduct warrantless searches of employee offices without probable
cause); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (school officials may conduct warrantless searches
of students without probable cause).
62 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (focusing on the reasonableness clause rather than
the Warrant Clause makes the Fourth Amendment "virtually devoid of meaning,
subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the prob-
lems of the day, choose to give that supple term [of reasonableness]"); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Fourth Amendments protections should
not be defaced by 'a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection
against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest said to justify a
search and seizure") (citation omitted); Id. at 369 (balancing tests "amount to brief
nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court
in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will"); Bookspan, supra note
54, at 508 ("While a reasonableness standard acknowledges the need to address
the substantive choices required by competing interests, it establishes a balancing
scale of justice that too easily can be tipped by the heavy hand of government.");
James B. Jacobs & Nadine Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized
Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595, 631-32 (1985) ("[T]he balancing approach markedly dimin-
ishes fundamental, historically rooted, Fourth Amendment protections."); Kenneth
Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 100 (1992) ("The danger is not so much
that balancing occurs, but rather that when governmental interests are so often
perceived as vital, the resulting balancing test mocks individual privacy rights.").
See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reason-
ableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
1404 [Vol. 59:1385
WARRANTS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
The dispute about whether to impose a warrant require-
ment in Griffin arose in analyzing the constitutionality of a
warrantless search of a probationer's home without probable
cause.63 Justice Scalia's majority opinion upheld the chal-
lenged search because it was authorized by probation depart-
ment regulations 6' which allowed warrantless searches upon
reasonable suspicion that probationers possessed contra-
band.65 Four dissenting justices agreed with the majority that
probable cause was unnecessary to sustain the search.66
Three of the dissenters, however, in an opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, argued that the search was unreasonable
because it was not authorized by a warrant.
Justice Scalia cited several reasons why it is reasonable to
The search was undertaken after a police detective told a probation officer
"that there were or might be guns in Griffins apartment." Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987). Based solely on that tip, two probation officers and
three police officers conducted a warrantless search of Griffin's apartment and
found a handgun. Id. at 870-71. Griffm was convicted of being a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm. Griffin appealed his conviction, arguing that the handgun was
the fruit of an unlawful search. Id. at 872. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed
Griffin's conviction, holding that the search was supported by reasonable grounds
to believe weapons were present and that the warrantless search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because of a probationer's diminished expectation of
privacy. In upholding the search, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
it was "most unlikely" that the searching officers had sufficient information to
establish probable cause. Id. at 878.
64 Id. at 870-71.
' Id. at 880. The probation regulations required reasonable grounds to search,
a standard the Court equated with reasonable suspicion. Id. at 875. The Court
reasoned that if probable cause were required to search probationers, "[tihe proba-
tioner would be assured that so long as his illegal . . . activities were sufficiently
concealed as to give rise to no more that reasonable suspicion, they would go
undetected." Id. at 878.
6 Id. at 887.
6'7 Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Brennan argued that the search should
have been conducted pursuant to a warrant and that the officers lacked reasonable
grounds to search. Id. at 882, 887-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The remaining
dissenting justice, Justice Stevens, joined only the portion of Justice Blackmun's
dissent that argued that the probation officers lacked reasonable grounds to search
Griffin's house. Thus, for Justice Stevens the warrantless search would have com-
plied with the Fourth Amendment if reasonable grounds had existed. Id. at 890
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens's position in Griffin is consistent with his view that adminis-
trative search warrants unsupported by the traditional standard of probable cause
are unconstitutional. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 302 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring);
see also infra note 166.
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dispense with a warrant requirement. 8 Most concern the
needs of an effective probation system, but one focuses on the
text of the Fourth Amendment. Because the Amendment's
second clause provides that no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause,"69 Justice Scalia concluded that a warrant
unsupported by probable cause violates a clear constitutional
prohibition.7" "[Wlhere the matter is of such a nature as to
require a judicial warrant," Justice Scalia reasoned, "it is also
of such a nature as to require probable cause."7' Moreover,
Justice Scalia argued that precedent supports this literal inter-
pretation.72 Justice Blackmun, however, responded, "[Tihere is
no need to deny the protection by the warrant requirement
simply because a search can be justified by less than probable
cause,"73 and noted that the Court previously had imposed a




Camara's variable standard of probable cause presents a
significant obstacle to Justice Scalia's interpretation of the
Warrant Clause. Under a variable standard, the reasonable-
ness of the search undertaken in Griffin would establish proba-
ble cause to impose a warrant requirement. Justice Scalia at-
tempted to reconcile Camara with his position in Griffin by
' Justice Scalia observed that "[a] warrant requirement would interfere to an
appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than
a probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer re-
quires." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876. Justice Scalia also noted that "the delay inherent
in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to re-
spond quickly to evidence of misconduct . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect
that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create." Id. (citations
omitted). But some of Griffin's conclusions concerning the needs of a probation
system that justify dispensing with the warrant requirement are of questionable
validity. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Massa-
chusetts v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 (Mass. 1988); William B. Weiler, Griffin v.
Wisconsin: Warrantless Probation Searches-Do the State's Needs Warrant Such
Strict Measures?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 921 (1988).
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 2.
7 See supra note 10.
71 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877.
72 Id.
" Id. at 882 n.1.
74 Id.
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distinguishing between administrative and judicial warrants.
The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where the matter
is of such a nature to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a
nature as to require probable cause. Although we have arguably
come to permit an exception to that prescription for administrative
search warrants, which may but do not necessarily have to be issued
by courts, we have never done so for constitutionally mandated
judicial warrants.75
Judicial warrants thus differ from administrative warrants
based on two factors. First, administrative warrants can be,
but do not have to be, issued by judicial officers.76 Judicial
warrants presumably can be issued only by judicial officers.
Second, the warrants are supported by different standards of
probable cause. Probable cause for judicial warrants is estab-
lished by a quantum of particularized suspicion,7" while prob-
able cause for administrative warrants is established by a vari-
able reasonableness standard.7" Thus, when Justice Scalia
concluded that the Warrant Clause prohibits judicial warrants
without probable cause, what he really meant is that warrants
that must be issued by judicial officers must also be supported
by the quantum of particularized suspicion that establishes
traditional probable cause.
There are two problems with Justice Scalia's attempt to
reconcile Camara with his interpretation of the Warrant
Clause. First, the text of the Warrant Clause does not autho-
rize different standards of probable cause to support different
categories of warrants. If the plain meaning of the Amendment
prohibits a warrant requirement in Griffin, it must also pro-
hibit a warrant requirement in Camara. In both cases tradi-
tional probable cause did not exist, yet in Camara a warrant
requirement was imposed, while in Griffin the Court concluded
" Id. at 877-78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
7' Id. at 877 & n.5.
' The Griffin Court equated the "ordinary requirement of probable cause" for
judicial warrants with "a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search,
to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion." Id. at
877 n.4. The quantum of suspicion required to establish traditional probable cause
is unclear. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
"' "In the administrative search context, we formally require that administra-
tive warrants be supported by 'probable cause,' because in that context we use
that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement
of reasonableness." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 n.4.
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that a warrant requirement would violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. In trying to reconcile the two cases, Justice Scalia mere-
ly emphasizes that the meaning of the Warrant Clause is not
as clear as he suggests.
Second, it is misleading for Justice Scalia to attempt to
characterize administrative warrants as "arguably" creating an
exception to the constitutional requirement that judicial war-
rants be supported by traditional probable cause. Instead, the
administrative search cases allow judicial officers to issue
warrants upon probable cause, albeit a different standard of
probable cause than required by the traditional definition. 9
Indeed, if Justice Scalia is correct and administrative warrants
are exceptions to the prohibition in the Warrant Clause, the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is not clear from its text,
which prohibits all warrants without probable cause. Thus, by
attempting to reconcile Camara with his interpretation of the
Warrant Clause, Justice Scalia has either established that
Camara was wrongly decided or that a warrant requirement in
Griffin is not textually precluded. But even if Camara was
wrongly decided, the plain meaning of the Warrant Clause
would not answer the interpretive question posed by Griffin.
B. In Search of the Plain Meaning of the Warrant Clause
Although the plain meaning rule"0 is most often applied
' See supra notes 37-39 & 48-51 and accompanying text.
o The Court has explained the plain meaning rule as follows:
... [T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain, . .. the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms.
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one mean-
ing the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to
aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citations omitted); see also
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) ("Our task is to give
effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably
plain terms, 'that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'") (quoting
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
Even the plain meaning of an enactment can be disregarded if a literal inter-
pretation would lead to absurd results.
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports
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in interpreting statutes, it can apply to constitutional interpre-
tation as well."l Yet, the most frequently litigated constitu-
tional provisions are framed in general terms, 2 and it is
therefore not surprising that the plain meaning rule is only
occasionally applied in constitutional litigation.' The assump-
are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of
the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an
act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which
follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreason-
able to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892); see also
United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("[E]ven when
the plain meaning [of legislation] did not produce absurd results but merely an
unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole'
this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.") (citation
omitted). See generally 2A SINGER, supra note 14, § 46.07.
8 See Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819):
[A]lthough the spirit of the instrument, especially of a constitution, is to
be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected
chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer
from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an in-
strument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.
But see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186-87 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (The Bill of Rights, unlike statutes, was not designed "to prescribe with
'precision' permissible and impermissible activities .... [We strive, when inter-
preting these seminal constitutional provisions, to effectuate their purposes . . .");
but see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1989) ("[Literalism is never a very a [sic] sensible
method of constitutional interpretation, and with respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment, it is especially bizarre because the evidence is clear that the Framers them-
selves never focused their attention on the precise language of the amendment.");
see supra note 37 (discussing how the Fourth Amendment was adopted by Con-
gress in a form apparently different than intended).
2 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 789
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution is not a deed setting forth the
precise metes and bounds of its subject matter; rather, it is a document announc-
ing fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for the
exercise of normative judgment by those charged with interpreting and applying
it.").
The most frequently cited example of a constitutional provision having a plain
meaning is the requirement that the President be thirty-five years old. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. But see Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction; The
"Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1989) (discussing
cases where the meaning of the words of this constitutional provision may be
uncertain).
2 See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (relying on plain
meaning of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 to hold that court martial jurisdiction is dependent
on the sole factor of the military status of defendant).
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tion behind the rule-that words have meaning independent of
the context in which they are used or applied-has been fre-
quently criticized." Nevertheless, with Justice Scalia's ap-
pointment to the Court, the plain meaning rule has taken on
increased significance in both statutory and constitutional
interpretation.85 But, the plain meaning rule cannot decide
the question posed by Griffin because the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrants without
probable clause is not self-defining.
Consider the facially ambiguous probable cause require-
ment. 6 The Amendment does not address what probable
cause is or how it is established. While the framers required
some degree of suspicion to support every warranted search
and seizure, questions concerning the necessary degree of sus-
picion were probably far from their minds. There is no reported
discussion of the question in the pre-constitutional history, nor
is it clear that the framers viewed probable cause as requiring
the same degree of suspicion for every warranted search and
seizure. We do not know whether the framers would have
8 See, e.g., 2A SINGER, supra note 14, § 46.01 (Statements of plain meaning
rule "cannot be taken at face value since parties litigate the issue of meaning all
the way to a court of last resort. In many instances, expressions of the plain
meaning rule represent an attempt to reinforce confidence in an interpretation
arrived at on other grounds."); Michael R. Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain
Meaning Rule, 4 DAYTON L. REV. 31 (1979); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Nev-
er Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the 'Modern"
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1975) ("Nor is it necessary to ex-
pend much effort in proving the semantic invalidity of the notion that words ...
can have fixed meanings apart from the context in which they are used. As is so
often the case, the short answer was given by Judge Learned Hand, when he said
that '[tihere is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.'")
(footnotes omitted).
" See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Before Justice Scalia's appoint-
ment, commentators disagreed on the importance the Court attributed to the plain
meaning rule. Compare Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982) (plain
meaning approach is now predominant) with Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations
on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REv. 195, 195 (1982) ("[A1lthough the Court still refers to the 'plain meaning' rule,
the rule has effectively been laid to rest.").
88 A dictionary definition of the adjective "probable" lists several definitions.
Some, but not all, suggest a standard of more-likely-than-not. THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Unabridged ed. 1967) ("1. likely to occur
or prove true . . . 2. having more evidence for than against . . . 3. affording
ground for belief).
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considered the degree of particularized suspicion supporting
the search in Griffin as establishing probable cause. What we
do know, however, is that the common- law concept of probable
cause was not very demanding."
Until recently it was unclear whether satisfying a prepon-
derance standard was required to establish probable cause.'
In Illinois v. Gates,89 however, the Court stressed that proba-
ble cause is not susceptible to a mathematical formula." In-
stead, the Court described probable cause as "a fluid
concept-turning on an assessment of probabilities in particu-
"?Hale spoke consistently of "probable cause to suspect" rather than
"probable cause to believe," and his illustration revealed that probable
cause was not always an extremely demanding concept. For example, if
one member of a gang of robbers had been identified and if a second
person later were found traveling in his company, these facts alone
would justify an arrest of the known robber's traveling companion. Other
sources confirmed that very little evidence could establish probable cause
in the pre-revolutionary period. Several authorities declared that, so long
as an offense had been committed, the common opinion of the public that
a particular person had committed it would justify his arrest.
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 253-54 (citations omitted).
The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, upon which many of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights were based, did not even require probable cause to
support a warrant. Section X provided "[that general warrants, whereby an officer
or messenger may be commanded to search suspected place without evidence of a
fact committed .. .are grievous and oppressive, and ought not be granted." VA.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § X (1776), reprinted in 7 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTI-
TUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 1492-1908, at 3814 (F.N. Thorpe ed., 1909) (emphasis
added).
" For example, the Court had held that probable cause to arrest exists when
evidence is "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect]
had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964). This standard led one commentator to observe that "such a belief would
clearly not be warranted if the facts available to the officer made it as likely as
not that he was wrong." Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 306-07 (1984). But see Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (probable cause "does not require the fine resolution of
conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard
demands"); Daniel M. Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A Response to "The
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment," 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 25 (1984) (when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted, probable cause did not require proof of a
preponderance standard).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
'o Id. at 231 ("Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the
probable-cause standard is that it is a 'practical, nontechnical conception." (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))). Professor Grano argues that
Gate's reliance upon Brinegar "is deceiving because the Brinegar Court did not
address the probable cause 'standard' at all." Grano, supra note 40, at 336-37.
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lar contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules."9' This "fluid concept" was equated with the
standards of "fair probability," "the totality of the circumstanc-
es," "substantial chance" and a "practical common sense deci-
sion."92
The Court's attempt in Gates to clarify probable cause is
antithetical to a plain meaning interpretation of the Warrant
Clause because the standards used to give meaning to the
probable cause requirement are not discernable from the
Amendment's text. Moreover, the impreciseness of those stan-
dards underscores that, even when clarified through interpre-
tation, the quantum of suspicion required for probable cause is
hardly free from ambiguity.93
Consider now the warrant requirement. Is any authoriza-
tion to search or seize a "warrant" or should the term be limit-
ed to authorizations for the type of searches and seizures sanc-
91 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
Gates abandoned the Aguilar and Spinelli two-prong test for determining the
existence of probable cause based on informants' tips. In its place, the Court held
that probable cause should be determined by
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations. The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay informa-
tion, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.
Id. at 238 (citations omitted). Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court noted that
'probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activi-
ty, not the actual showing of such activity." Id. at 245 n.13.
" Additional ambiguity arises from the attempt to contrast traditional probable
cause with the lesser quantum of suspicion, reasonable suspicion, that supports
some searches and seizures. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 ("[W]e use
'probable cause' to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the
search, to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion.'").
Reasonable suspicion, the Court has stated, requires awareness "of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably
warrant suspicion." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). It
is appropriate to question, however, whether persons required to enforce and inter-
pret the criminal law can distinguish meaningfully the "practical common-sense"
and "fair probability" standards that establish probable cause from the quantum of
certainty that establishes reasonable suspicion. Perhaps the most that can be said
about the quantum of suspicion that establishes traditional probable cause is that
it is more demanding than reasonable suspicion and, like Justice Stewart's concept
of obscenity, judges "know it when they see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tioned by common-law warrants? 4 A seizure of several sus-
pects for fingerprinting without probable cause, for example,
was unknown to the framers. If a court issues a "Judicial Au-
thorization" to seize a suspect to obtain fingerprints based
merely upon reasonable suspicion, has a warrant been is-
sued?9 If the judge who had sentenced Griffin to probation
issued an "Order to Determine Whether Probation Shall be
Revoked" which authorized a search of Griffin's house for
weapons, would a warrant have been issued? The text of the
Amendment does not answer either question. It prohibits war-
rants without probable cause, but it defines neither a warrant
nor probable cause.
Assuming we know what a warrant is, who can issue one?
Although judicial officers issued the writs of assistance that so
troubled the colonists,' executive officers issued other general
warrants." In prohibiting warrants without probable cause,
the Amendment would appear to address warrants issued by
any governmental official. On its face, however, the Amend-
ment is silent on who can issue a constitutional warrant.
By interpreting the Amendment to require "neutral and
detached" judicial officers to issue most search warrants, the
Court furthers the Amendment's preference for before-the-fact
approval of searches by persons removed from "the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."" In contrast, ad-
" Cf California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1993 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (Fourth Amendment affords protection of common law and "includes the
requirement of a warrant, where the common law required a warrant"); California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (relying on common-law definition of seizure to
determine whether commanding someone to stop constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment when the suspect does not submit to the command).
' See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
' See LANDYNSKI, supra note 16, at 31-37 (noting that while the writs were
supposed to be issued by the courts, most judges refused their issuance).
', Executive officers issued general warrants in England, and undoubtedly they
did so in the colonies. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION 25-27 (1969) (general warrants in England were ordinarily issued by
executive rather than judicial officers).
98 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The reason for requir-
ing a warrant to be issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer was eloquent-
ly stated by Justice Jackson:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those interferences be drawn by a neutral and
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detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers ...
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman ....
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court for the
Eastern Dist. of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) ("The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may
yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook poten-
tial invasions of privacy . . . ."); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56
(1948) ("Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police .... The right of privacy was
deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detec-
tion of crime and the arrest of criminals."). This preference for warranted searches,
however, has not been extended to seizures of persons in public. See United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (police may make a warrantless felony arrest
in public even though they have time to obtain a warrant).
Whether or not the Amendment reflects a preference for search warrants is
much disputed. The leading proponent of the view that it does not, Professor
Taylor, argued that "Justice Frankfurter, and others who have viewed the Fourth
Amendment primarily as a requirement that searches be covered by warrants,
have stood the [A]mendment on its head. Such was not the history of the matter,
such was not the original understanding." TAYLOR, supra note 97, at 46-47. Rath-
er, Taylor argues that the framers "were not concerned about warrantless search-
es, but about overreaching warrants .... Far from looking at the warrant as a
protection against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unrea-
sonable and oppressive searches . . . ." Id. at 41. Thus, in Taylor's view, the War-
rant Clause was not intended to prohibit warrantless searches, but only general
warrants. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Scalia have accepted
Taylor's argument. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("the supposed 'general rule' that a warrant is always required does
not appear to have any basis in the common law"); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment does not require
search warrants, but only that searches be reasonable; preference for warrants is
merely "judicially created preference"); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
328 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 72 ("The Fourth Amendment does not
reflect mistrust of searches made without warrants issued by magistrates; it re-
flects a concern, consistent with the general mistrust of officialdom in the Consti-
tution and Bill of Rights, that magistrates might issue unreasonably broad war-
rants."); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1178-81 (1991) (common-law warrants were used to protect officers from
trespass actions, not to protect privacy).
Professor Grano argues that when considered in its context, Taylor's attack on
the view that the Amendment creates a preference for search warrants only con-
cerned the issue of whether a warrant must support a search incident to an ar-
rest. Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19
AM. CRM. L. REV. 603, 616 (1982). If, however, Taylor intended to attack the
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ministrative search warrants can issue upon neutral criteria as
one component of a regulatory scheme designed to further
purposes broader than the mere enforcement of the criminal
law. Under such circumstances, it can be argued that executive
officers are unlikely to have a strong personal stake in the
outcome of an administrative search and presumably can make
an independent assessment of whether a proposed search is
undertaken pursuant to the administrative scheme.9 Howev-
er, the plain meaning of the Amendment neither compels nor
prohibits the distinction between judicial and administrative
warrants; the Amendment's text is silent on the issue.
Against this background, interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment to permit the imposition of a judicial warrant require-
ment for searches and seizures that are constitutionally rea-
sonable without traditional probable cause does not conflict
with the plain meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The War-
Amendment's general preference for search warrants, Grano concludes that "he
failed to prove his point." Id. Grano contends that regardless of whether the fram-
ers specifically stated a preference for warrants in the Amendment, "history unde-
niably supports the proposition that the framers opposed leaving the power to
search and seize solely in executive hands" and that "the framers' basic purpose
[in enacting the Amendment was] . . . seeking judicial control over executive offi-
cials whom they did not trust to make search and seizure decisions on their own."
Id. at 620, 621.
In contrast to Grano, Professor Wasserstrom concludes that it "is an untena-
ble position" to argue that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
require prior judicial approval for searches and seizures. Wasserstrom, supra note
88, at 283. Wasserstrom argues "that there is no evidence that the framers in-
tended to control executive discretion through the mechanism of the special war-
rant." Id. at 296. Nevertheless, Wasserstrom concludes that the Court was correct
in interpreting the Amendment to state a preference for warrants since it furthers
values identical to those reflected by the framers in outlawing general warrants.
"[Bly outlawing general warrants in the Warrant Clause, the colonists sought to
ensure that executive discretion would be judicially controlled in very much the
same way that the Court now seeks to control that discretion through the warrant
requirement." Id. at 294-95.
Wasserstrom's position is similar to that of Professor Amsterdam, who con-
tends that the framers lacked any intent regarding when warrants should be re-
quired but left that issue to the courts. Amsterdam, supra note 40, at 398-99, 410-
12. Amsterdam agrees with Taylor's often-quoted observation that in interpreting
the Amendment to state a preference for warrants, the Court has "stood the
Amendment on its head." However, unlike Taylor, Amsterdam approves of this
outcome, concluding that the Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is
similar to the way that 'the Court has stood the commerce clause on its head in
order to allow a collection of states to grow into a nation." Id. at 410.
" But see infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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rant Clause does not state that judicial warrants must issue
upon traditional probable cause. Rather, it requires that some-
thing known as a "warrant" must be supported by something
that establishes "probable cause." What those two terms mean
is subject to interpretation, and Camara emphasizes just how
flexibly the Fourth Amendment can be interpreted to further
its underlying purpose of controlling the unbridled discretion of
governmental officials.
C. Implications of Griffin
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Griffin prohibiting judicial warrants unsupported by tradition-
al probable cause is dicta since the Court held that the war-
rantless search in that case was reasonable.'00 However, if
the Fourth Amendment must be interpreted as advanced by
Justice Scalia, Griffin's dicta may have a far greater impact on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than its holding.
1. Overruling Camara
Applying variable probable cause to authorize administra-
tive search warrants, but refusing to apply it to other searches
and seizures is symptomatic of the Court's lack of a coherent
theory for interpreting the Fourth Amendment.' Consider-
ing the importance of particularized suspicion to the framers'
concept of probable cause,0 2 the inconsistency with which
variable probable cause has been applied' 3 and the changes
on the Court since Camara,"4 the continued viability of
"' See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
"' Professor Bradley has referred to the Fourth Amendment as "the Supreme
Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the
'Brethren' in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them
more profoundly stuck." Bradley, supra note 1, at 1468; see also Sundby, supra
note 1, at 383 ("In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Su-
preme Court has struggled continually, and unsuccessfully, to develop a coherent
analytical framework.").
10 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 52.
" Camara was written by Justice White. No other member of the 1992 Court
had joined his Camara opinion. Moreover, in 1978, when Justice White voted as
part of a five-member majority to impose a Camara-type warrant for an adminis-
trative search, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), three members
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Camara's variable standard of probable cause is question-
able.10
5
Griffin itself may signal the eventual overruling of
Camara through its characterization of the administrative
search cases as "arguably" permitting an exception to the con-
stitutional requirement that judicial warrants be supported by
traditional probable cause."' Justice Scalia distinguished be-
tween administrative and judicial warrants based on the abili-
ty of executive officers to issue administrative, but not judicial
warrants. But as the Griffin dissenters noted, judicial officers
can issue administrative warrants.0 7 In Camara, the Court
in fact assumed that it had imposed a judicial warrant re-
quirement,0 8 and this understanding was shared by the dis-
senters.0 9 Justice Scalia's distinction between judicial and
administrative warrants, therefore, may be one without a dif-
ference if judicial officers must issue both types of warrants. In
this event, Camara, a decision that Justice Scalia characterizes
as an "arguable" exception to the constitutional requirement
that judicial warrants be supported by traditional probable
cause, may not survive further review by the Court.
of the 1992 Court (Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Rehnquist) dissented and ar-
gued that the Warrant Clause states a "requirement that a warrant only issue on
a showing of particularized probable cause . " Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
1"0 Griffin's reliance upon Frank for the rule "that 'if a search warrant be con-
stitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense
with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue,'" Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 878 (1987), casts further doubt on the viability of Camara. What is
significant about this quote from Frank is that immediately preceding it, Justice
Frankfurter belittled a warrant authorizing periodic inspections of housing as a
"synthetic search warrant." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959). Camara,
of course, repudiated this characterization. The Griffin Court's reliance upon Frank
to argue against "flexibly interpret[ing] the Warrant Clause" strongly suggests that
the Rehnquist Court believes that Camara was wrongly decided.
" Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877.
107 Id. at 882 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (the determination
whether to issue an inspection warrant involves "questions which may be reviewed
by a neutral magistrate").
" See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 548 n.1 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(Requiring a court-imposed warrant "could more appropriately be the function of
the agency involved than that of the magistrate .... It is therefore unfortunate




2. Prohibiting Defensive Use of Warrants for Non-
Administrative Searches
Under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, a holding that a search or seizure does not require tradi-
tional probable cause removes the possibility of imposing a
judicial warrant requirement. This inability to impose a war-
rant requirement can put a court in a constitutional straight-
jacket.11 ° Although a court can authorize searches and sei-
zures without traditional probable cause, it cannot use war-
rants defensively to protect privacy interests. If a warrant re-
quirement is a prerequisite to establishing the reasonableness
of a search or seizure, a court faces two unattractive choices.
The first is to minimize the importance of a warrant and
to uphold the constitutionality of the warrantless conduct. The
second is to conclude that a warrant is necessary to establish
the reasonableness of the conduct. In this instance, a court
must hold that the search or seizure cannot occur because it
lacks the constitutional authority to impose a warrant require-
ment. Under the first approach, the privacy interests that
would be protected by defensive use of a warrant are sacrificed
to further the societal interest in authorizing the conduct with-
out probable cause. Under the second approach, the societal
interest that would be furthered by authorizing the conduct
without probable cause is sacrificed because of the court's in-
ability to establish the reasonableness of the conduct through a
warrant requirement. The facts in People v. Madson"' and
United State v. Onyema12 highlight the dilemma that a court
can face under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Warrant
Clause.
In Madson, the police suspected the defendant of murder
but apparently did not have probable cause to arrest. A Colora-
do Rule of Criminal Procedure allows a court to order a suspect
to be taken into custody to obtain non-testimonial evi-
110 Professors Haddad, Zagel, Starkman and Bauer have suggested that inter-
preting the Amendment to prohibit a warrant requirement for administrative
searches places a straitjacket on the Court. See JAMES B. HADDAD ET AL., CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 419 (3d ed. 1987).
... 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981).
1.2 766 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded without opinion by 952 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1991).
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dence."' The affidavit in support of the order must establish
probable cause that a crime has been committed and reason-
able grounds, not amounting to probable cause, that the sus-
pect has committed the crime.14  Pursuant to this rule,
Madson was seized and the police obtained a variety of non-
testimonial evidence, including a handwriting exemplar."5 At
trial, a critical piece of evidence was a letter allegedly written
by Madson to the victim, and the exemplar apparently estab-
lished that the letter was genuine.' On appeal, Madson ar-
gued unsuccessfully that the court rule authorizing his deten-
tion was unconstitutional since it allowed a seizure without
probable cause.1 7 In upholding the seizure, the Colorado Su-
preme Court emphasized that the order authorizing Madson's
.13 An order shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to or affirmed
before the judge and establishing the following grounds for the order:
(1) That there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been com-
mitted;
(2) That there are reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause
to arrest, to suspect that the person named or described in the affidavit
committed the offense; and
(3) That the results of specific nontestimonial identification procedures
will be of material aid in determining whether the person named in the
affidavit committed the offense.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(c).
The Colorado rule, which was adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in
October 1969, is essentially identical to a federal rule of criminal procedure pro-
posed in early 1971 and later rejected by the Committee of Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judiciary Conference of the United States. Note, Detention to
Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Feder-
al Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72 COLUIi. L. REV. 712, 715 (1972); see United
States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977). The Committee specifically
rejected the Rule because it "evoked a number of serious questions which required
further study." Id. at 674. The Committee also believed that the federal courts
would have little need for the procedures contained in the Rule. Id.
Legislation implementing similar procedures found in Rule 41.1 was intro-
duced in the Senate in 1969 and later reintroduced in 1971. This legislation also
failed to be enacted. Id. at 673; Note, supra, at 715. These procedures for ordering
nontestimonial identification evidence may have failed to be adopted, despite the
dicta in Davis (and later in Hayes), because they "raise serious constitutional ques-
tions in that the procedures authorized are so similar to searches as to severely
test the Fourth Amendment's fundamental prohibition against searches and intru-
sions without probable cause." Note, supra, at 744.
"I COLO. R. CRIMi P. 41.1(c).
.. Madson, 638 P.2d at 22.
116 Id. at 23-24.
117 Id. at 31.
19941 1419
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
seizure required prior judicial approval."'
Assuming that the court order authorizing Madson's sei-
zure is the equivalent of a judicial warrant,1 and that the
constitutionality of Madson's seizure depends on a warrant
requirement, Justice Scalia would presumably have prohibited
the warranted seizure because it was not supported by proba-
ble cause. An otherwise reasonable method of investigation
designed to confirm or dispel quickly a suspect's involvement
in a crime would have been lost because of the inability to use
a warrant defensively. Under Justice Scalia's approach, the
seizure of Madson without probable cause could only occur if
its reasonableness did not depend on prior judicial authoriza-
tion. In cases where a search or seizure without probable cause
may be the only way to establish probable cause, a court might
diminish the importance of a warrant requirement to uphold
the warrantless conduct. The facts in United State v.
Onyema 2 ° illustrate this situation.
In Onyema, Customs agents had reasonable suspicion that
Onyema was importing heroin into the country in balloons he
had swallowed.' 2' Without obtaining a warrant, the agents
shackled Onyema to a bed and waited patiently for nineteen
hours for him "to move his bowels and confirm his guilt or
innocence, and, if the former, to deliver up all the contra-
band." 2 After relieving himself, Onyema was directed to
wash his feces, separate the heroin and to turn the drugs over
to the officers.'23
Onyema moved to suppress the heroin as the fruit of an
unlawful seizure. In holding that the initial seizure was rea-
sonable, the district court acknowledged that a warrantless
seizure and detention of a person entering the country is ordi-
narily constitutional upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Nevertheless, the court held that the circumstanc-
Id. at 32.
... The ability of a court to authorize a search or seizure without issuing a
warrant is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 141-59.
120 766 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded without opinion by 952 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1991).
121 Id. at 77.
122 Id.
-' Id. at 78.
124 Id. at 79, 84.
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es surrounding Onyema's extended detention were so intrusive
that it required judicial authorization."rs On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, remanded the district
court's decision, suggesting that the case was controlled by a
second circuit opinion which appeared to authorize Onyema's
warrantless seizure."'
It may very well be that the Fourth Amendment does
authorize the highly intrusive detention of Onyema without a
warrant and without probable cause.'27 However, the ques-
tion of whether Onyema's warrantless detention is constitu-
tionally reasonable is very different than the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment could be interpreted to authorize a
warrant requirement if the reasonableness of his detention
was held to depend on judicial authorization. If judicial autho-
rization is required, Justice Scalia would not permit the deten-
tion unless the police had probable cause to arrest. A finding of
probable cause, however, depended upon the discovery of the
12 Id. at 80-81.
126 United States v. Onyema, 952 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit's
order cited United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991). In Esieke, the
Second Circuit held that the warrantless detention of the defendant upon suspicion
of smuggling drugs into the country for a period of one and one-half days in leg
irons and handcuffs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court "acknowl-
edge[d] that this is an extremely close case," but felt that its holding was com-
pelled by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.
Id. at 36. See infra note 127 for a discussion of Montoya de Hernandez.
127 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (upholding
16-hour warrantless detention of person entering country upon reasonable suspicion
of drug smuggling). The district court in Onyema distinguished the holding in
Montoya de Hernandez by noting that the defendant in that case merely chal-
lenged the degree of suspicion required to support her detention and not the fact
that the detention was accomplished without a warrant. Onyema, 766 F. Supp. at
79-80.
Montoya de Hernandez, Justice Brennan expressed disbelief that a warrant re-
quirement might be imposed in administrative search cases, such as Camara, but
not in the instant case:
Something has gone fundamentally awry in our constitutional jurispru-
dence when a neutral and detached magistrate's authorization is required
before the authorities may inspect "the plumbing, heating, ventilation,
gas, and electrical systems" in a person home, investigate the back rooms
of his workplace, or poke through the charred remains of his gutted ga-
rage, but not before they may hold him in indefinite involuntary isolation
at the Nation's border to investigate whether he might be engaged in
criminal wrongdoing.




balloons, which were found only because Onyema was detained
without probable cause. Thus, if a court were to hold that
Onyema's extended detention requires a warrant, the practical
effect would be that he could not be detained when he entered
the country because probable cause did not then exist to sup-
port a warrant. Under such circumstances, it is understand-
able how a judge bound by Justice Scalia's interpretation of the
Warrant Clause might be inclined to hold that the warrantless
detention was reasonable: to hold otherwise would mean that a
suspect such as Onyema escapes prosecution. Thus, interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment to prohibit defensive use of war-
rants may lead to a devaluation of the importance of a warrant
requirement in order to authorize searches and seizures under-
taken without probable cause.128
On one level, the division on the Griffin Court is a classic
clash between form and substance. For the majority, the text of
the Warrant Clause is dispositive. The dissenters, on the other
hand, appear ready to disregard the text to further the under-
lying purpose of the Amendment. The two competing approach-
es, however, also reflect the justices' failure to examine rigor-
ously the underlying assumptions and implications of two
fundamentally conflicting approaches to interpreting the
Fourth Amendment.
Justice Scalia's approach implies that the Constitution and
precedent are so clear on the disputed point that for one to
argue otherwise suggests illiteracy. The meaning of the War-
rant Clause, however, cannot be discerned solely from its text
because the terms "warrant" and "probable cause" are not self-
defining.129 Moreover, Justice Scalia's unpersuasive attempt
to distinguish between administrative and judicial warrants
128 Alternatively, a court might be tempted to hold that the challenged conduct
is not a search or seizure, thus removing the conduct from any Fourth Amend-
ment regulation. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1993 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("Our intricate body of law regarding 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' has been developed largely as a means of creating [exceptions to a war-
rant requirement], enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment
'search' and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement."); see, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (inspection of garbage placed outside
the curtilage is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment analysis); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (trespass on open fields is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment).
"2 See supra text accompanying notes 86-98.
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ultimately undercuts his textual interpretation.3 ' Far from
illustrating a rigid approach to interpreting the Amendment,
the administrative search cases highlight the Court's ability to
interpret the probable cause requirement flexibly to impose a
warrant requirement on any constitutionally reasonable search
or seizure.
Justice Scalia's position also reflects a narrow view of the
Court's authority to rely upon the unreasonable search and
seizure clause to dispense with the probable cause and warrant
requirements. If the Amendment is flexible enough to autho-
rize searches and seizures without either probable cause or a
warrant, is it not also implicitly flexible enough to sanction
searches and seizures supported by a warrant but not by prob-
able cause? Even assuming that the Warrant Clause is inter-
preted to prohibit such warrants, must that preclusion prevail
if the unreasonable search and seizure clause is interpreted to
authorize such warrants?
But while Justice Scalia's approach may be unpersuasive,
so, too, is Justice Blackmun's position. As stressed by Justice
Scalia, the Griffin dissenters fail to explain how, consistent
with the Warrant Clause, a warrant requirement can be im-
posed on a search that all justices agree is not supported by
probable cause. It is, after all, one thing to conclude that the
concept of probable cause is not susceptible to a precise defini-
tion. It is yet another to conclude that even if probable cause is
lacking, the Fourth Amendment can still authorize a warrant-
ed search or seizure despite the prohibition in the Warrant
Clause.
III. DEFENSIVE USE OF WARRANTS WITHOUT VARIABLE
PROBABLE CAUSE
Although it had not explicitly decided the issue before
Griffin, the Court in two cases had suggested that a warrant
requirement could be imposed defensively, even in the absence
of probable cause. The first case was Hayes v. Florida,3' de-
cided two years before Griffin. In Hayes, the police, lacking a
warrant or probable cause to arrest, took Hayes from his home
... See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
131 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
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to the police station to obtain his fingerprints.132 Hayes's fin-
gerprints matched those found at the crime scene and led to
his conviction. Hayes unsuccessfully challenged the admission
of his fingerprints in the state courts as the fruit of an illegal
seizure."'
The issue raised by Hayes was strikingly similar to that
presented in Davis v. Mississippi,T3 decided sixteen years
earlier. In Davis, the Court held that transporting a suspect to
a police station for fingerprinting without probable cause or a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.135 Not surprisingly,
the Court in Hayes relied upon Davis to hold the detention of
Hayes unconstitutional. 136 At the same time, the Court in
Hayes reaffirmed dicta from Davis strongly suggesting that a
seizure to obtain fingerprints without probable cause would be
constitutional if authorized by a warrant. 37
In Davis, the Court cited Camara to support its suggestion
that a warrant requirement could be imposed in the absence of
traditional probable cause.138 Despite the Davis and Hayes
dicta, it is unlikely that the Court today would apply Camara's
variable standard of probable cause to uphold a judicially au-
thorized seizure for fingerprinting undertaken without tradi-
tional probable cause. The Court limits application of variable
probable cause to administrative searches, and a judicially
authorized seizure for fingerprinting is very different than an
- Id. at 812-13.
133 Id.
134 394 U.S. 724, 726 (1969).
135 Id.
136 470 U.S. at 813-16.
137 The Court in Hayes held that the Fourth Amendment is violated
when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a
person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and
transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although brief-
ly, for investigative purposes. We adhere to the view that such seizures,
at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests
to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made
only on probable cause.
Id. at 816 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In declaring the detention in Hayes unconstitutional, the Court emphasized
that it did "not abandon the suggestion in Davis ... that under circumscribed
procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to authorize the
seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his removal to the police
station for the purpose of fingerprinting." Id. at 817.
1 394 U.S. at 727-28.
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administrative search. The former is for the sole purpose of
criminal investigation, while the latter is undertaken as part of
a regulatory scheme designed to further societal objectives that
are broader than the enforcement of the criminal law.
139
Moreover, Griffin's characterization of the administrative
search cases as an "arguable" exception to the text of the War-
rant Clause suggests that the current Court is more likely to
reject variable probable cause in administrative search cases
than to expand its application to criminal cases.'40
Although variable probable cause is unlikely to be used to
impose a warrant requirement for criminal investigatory
searches and seizures undertaken without traditional probable
cause, the Davis and Hayes dicta remains inconsistent with
Justice Scalia's conclusion that a judicial warrant must be
supported by traditional probable cause. The fingerprinting
cases presuppose that a judicial warrant can authorize a sei-
zure without traditional probable cause, while Griffin con-
cludes that the Fourth Amendment prohibits such warrants.
Can the Fourth Amendment be interpreted to authorize a
warrant requirement in the absence of traditional probable
cause without relying upon the existence of a variable stan-
dard of probable cause? The following sections discuss two
alternative interpretations to accomplish this result.
A. A Warrant by Any Other Name?
Can a judicial officer authorize a search or seizure without
issuing a "warrant"?' If so, it can be argued that the consti-
.39 See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
... See supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
... It is clear, however, that a suspect can be subpoenaed to appear before a
grand jury to provide non-testimonial evidence in the absence of probable cause to
arrest without subjecting the appearance to regulation under the Fourth Amend-
ment. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (grand jury subpoena to
obtain handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand
jury subpoena to obtain voice exemplar). In Dionisio, the Court held that the sub-
poena is not subject to the Fourth Amendment-analysis because "a subpoena to
appear before a grand jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense." Id.
at 9. The Court emphasized the difference between the invasion of privacy caused
by a subpoena, on the one hand, and an arrest or Terry stop, on the other:
The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the threat of it and often
in demeaning circumstance, and, in the case of arrest, results in a record
involving social stigma. A subpoena is served in the same manner as
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tutionality of the authorization should be decided under the
unreasonable search and seizure clause and not the Warrant
Clause. In Hayes, the Court interchangeably described a court
order for fingerprinting without probable cause as a judicial
authorization and as a warrant.' The Court may have re-
ferred to a judicial authorization for fingerprinting merely as
an alternative way to describe a warrant. However, if a judicial
authorization for fingerprinting is different than a warrant for
fingerprinting, the distinction might be used to bypass the
Warrant Clause's prohibition against warrants without proba-
ble cause.
The difference between warrants and other forms of judi-
cial authorization was of critical importance to the district
court in United States v. Onyema."' In Onyema, the court,
without applying a variable standard of probable cause, relied
upon the Davis and Hayes dicta to require judicial authoriza-
tion for the extended detention of a suspected drug smuggler
seized without probable cause."M In so doing, the district
court rejected the argument that the judicial authorization
would violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
warrants without probable cause:
While the Warrant Clause provides that warrants may issue only on
a showing of probable cause, it does not limit the capacity of the
Reasonableness Clause to require some kind ofjudicial authorization
to ensure that a search or seizure is reasonable where less than
other legal process; it involves no stigma whatever; if the time for ap-
pearance is inconvenient, this can generally be altered; and it remains at
all times under the control and supervision of a court.
Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1972)).
14 "None of our later cases have undercut the holding in Davis that transpor-
tation to and investigative detention at the station house without probable cause
or judicial authorization together violate the Fourth Amendment." United States v.
Hayes, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985) (emphasis added). "[Tihe holding in Davis [is]
that in the absence of probable cause or a warrant[,] investigative detentions at
the police station for fingerprinting purposes could not be square with the Fourth
Amendment." Id. [Involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to a police
station . . . absent probable cause or judicial authorization" is unconstitutional. Id.
(emphasis added).
143 766 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded without opinion by 952 F.2d 313 (2d
Cir. 1991). The facts in Onyema are discussed supra in notes 121-26 and accom-
panying text.
144 Onyema, 766 F. Supp. at 82-83.
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probable cause is required to justify the intrusion.14
The court thus removed its holding from an analysis under the
Warrant Clause by concluding that a judicial authorization for
a seizure is not tantamount to a warrant authorizing a seizure.
This approach is essentially the flip-side of the Supreme
Court's recent reliance on the unreasonable search and seizure
clause to sanction warrantless searches and seizures without
probable cause. Since Terry, the Court has recognized that the
probable cause requirement in the Warrant Clause is not dis-
positive of whether searches and seizures analyzed under the
unreasonable search and seizure clause require probable cause.
The same flexibility in interpreting the unreasonable search
and seizure clause to allow searches and seizures without
probable cause also might apply to the type of judicial authori-
zation that must support searches and seizures that are rea-
sonable without probable cause. Under this approach, the War-
rant Clause would be interpreted to address only the type of
suspicion that supports "traditional warrants." A traditional
warrant could be defined as the type of judicial authorization
that must support a search or seizure requiring traditional
probable cause. The requirement in the Warrant Clause that
warrants be supported by probable cause, however, need not be
dispositive of whether the unreasonable search and seizure
clause could sanction searches and seizures by "some [other]
kind of judicial authorization"'46 supported by less than prob-
able cause. If a search or seizure without traditional probable
cause is authorized under the unreasonable search and seizure
clause, a non-traditional warrant requirement could be im-
posed to establish the reasonableness of the conduct.
Ironically, this approach is suggested by Justice Scalia's
attempt in Griffin to reconcile Camara with his interpretation
of the Warrant Clause. Recall that Justice Scalia distinguishes
between administrative and judicial warrants and the type of
probable cause that supports both. 47 Under the approach
suggested here, Justice Scalia's concept of a judicial warrant is
the paradigm of the type of authorization addressed in the
Warrant Clause. A judicial warrant must be issued by a judi-
... Id. at 82.
1 See supra text accompanying note 145.
14 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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cial officer, it must be supported by a relatively high degree of
particularized suspicion and it authorizes a search or seizure
undertaken for the sole purpose of criminal investigation. An
administrative warrant is very different. It might issue from
an executive officer, it does not require any degree of particu-
larized suspicion and it must be authorized under a regulatory
scheme addressing a societal concern that is broader than the
general need for law enforcement. It is therefore understand-
able why the Camara dissenters decried administrative war-
rants as "new-fangled warrants."48 Indeed, administrative
warrants are so unlike judicial warrants that the term "admin-
istrative inspection authorization" may more appropriately de-
scribe the type of advance authorization required by Camara.
If an administrative inspection authorization is not a tradition-
al warrant, it would not be covered by the Warrant Clause and
would not require probable cause. The authorization could be
upheld under the unreasonable search and seizure clause with-
out the need to vary the definition of probable cause under the
Warrant Clause.
This approach might also be applied in criminal cases to
allow judicial authorization of searches and seizures by some-
thing other than a warrant. Indeed, in the context of the limit-
ed type of seizure to obtain non-testimonial evidence contem-
plated by the Supreme Court in Hayes and Davis, lower courts
have considered whether searches and seizures that must be
judicially authorized can only be authorized by warrants.
Some courts have rejected a distinction between warrants
and other judicial authorizations for searches and seizures. For
these courts, a warrant by any other name is still a warrant.
In People v. Marshall,' for example, the prosecutor sought
judicial authorization to obtain blood and hair samples from a
murder suspect.5 ' The lower court "granted the request but,
in lieu of issuing a search warrant, signed an order captioned
'Order Granting Temporary Detention of [the suspect] For The
Purpose of Obtaining A Blood Sample and Hair Sample."
' 15
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that in the
148 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
1- 244 N.W.2d 451 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
0 Id. at 453.
151 Id.
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absence of a statute authorizing the detention order, "there is
no such 'animal' in this jurisdiction as a court order authoriz-
ing the detention of a suspect for the purpose of a search."52
Despite the title of the detention authorization, the appellate
court concluded that it was a warrant because "[iut was issued
upon sworn affidavit, described the person to be searched, and
was signed by an impartial magistrate."'53
On the other hand, in Arizona v. Grijalva,* the Arizona
Supreme Court upheld a court-ordered detention of a suspect
to obtain photographs, fingerprints and hair samples without
probable cause to arrest.'55 The court emphasized that the
detention order, issued pursuant to statute, 156 was very dif-
ferent than an arrest warrant since the order allowed deten-
tion for only a limited period.'57 Moreover, the intrusiveness
of obtaining the identification evidence was "relatively slight"
when compared to an arrest.55 While acknowledging that the
Fourth Amendment requires warrants to be supported by prob-
able cause, the court relied upon the Hayes and Davis dicta to
conclude that "[a] temporary detention order is not, however, of
the stature of a warrant necessitating probable cause."
59
... Id. at 457. The court's suggestion that the order might have been upheld if
authorized by statute does not necessarily establish that the order would have
been constitutional. Although legislative authorization of the detention order would
provide the statutory basis for the order, it would not be dispositive of constitu-
tionality under the Fourth Amendment.
.. Id. at 458. Although the prosecutor assumed that probable cause did not
exist to support the court order, the appellate court disagreed and upheld the
court order as a warrant supported by probable cause. Id.
An approach similar to that taken in Marshall was followed by the New York
Court of Appeals in In re Death of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 294, 437 N.E.2d 265,
268, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1982) ("Nomenclature notwithstanding, if the application
and the relief comport with all the requisites of a search warrant, it may be tak-
en for what it is.") (citation omitted); see also In re Order Req. Fingerprinting of a
Juv., 537 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ohio 1989) (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (A court order
authorizing detention without probable cause "constitutes nothing more and noth-
ing less than a search warrant.").
154 533 P.2d 533 (Ariz. 1975).
Id. at 534-35.
156 5A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1424 (1989), renumbered as 5B ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1989 & Supp. 1993). Other states have similar statutes.
See, e.g., 4A IDAHO CODE § 19-625 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-271-279 (1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 (1982).
1 7 Grijalva, 533 P.2d at 535.
"a Id. at 536.
169 Id. at 535. Similarly, in United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.
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There are, however, two significant problems with inter-
preting the unreasonable search and seizure clause to autho-
rize what is essentially a form of "mini-warrant" unsupported
by traditional probable cause. First, the type of judicial autho-
rization contemplated in cases such as Onyema and Grijalva
appears to be the functional equivalent of a warrant. Limiting
the use of "mini-warrants" to administrative searches and
minimally intrusive criminal investigatory searches and sei-
zures does not respond to the concern that a 'Judicial authori-
zation" for a search or seizure has the same essential attrib-
utes as a warrant. Attempting to bypass analysis under the
Warrant Clause merely by giving a different name to some-
thing that for all intents and purposes is the equivalent of a
warrant seems as formalistic and unconvincing as Justice
Scalia's conclusion that the text of the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a warrant requirement in Griffin. Second, even if a
judicial authorization under the unreasonable search and sei-
zure clause is not the functional equivalent of a warrant, judi-
cial authorizations, although designed to protect privacy, can
be used to weaken Fourth Amendment protection, a concern
addressed in the final Part of this Article.
B. Trumping the Warrant Clause
This section begins with the assumption that the Warrant
Clause requires traditional probable cause for all judicially
authorized searches and seizures. In this instance, the War-
rant Clause would prohibit judicial authorization of the sei-
zures in Davis and Hayes and the searches in Camara and
Griffin. It is a familiar rule of interpretation, however, that the
meaning of an enactment cannot be discerned by reliance upon
only a single section or clause. 6' This is particularly true in
1977), the court distinguished between a warrant and an order issued without
probable cause requiring a prisoner to provide a handwriting exemplar.
[Tihe order below was not a search warrant either in form or in sub-
stance. A search warrant is not an order but is a grant of authority for
a law enforcement officer to search premises for and to seize specified
objects already in existence. Nothing need be done by the person who is
the cause or object of the search. The order below, however, was directed
solely to a subject of the investigation and ordered him to create some-
thing-namely, handwriting exemplars.
Id. at 675.
... This principle, known as the "whole statute" approach to interpretation, has
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence where the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Warrant Clause are prime
determinants of constitutionality under the unreasonable
search and seizure clause.'6' Even if the Court holds that the
Warrant Clause prohibits judicial authorization of a search or
seizure unless supported by traditional probable cause, impos-
ing a warrant requirement without traditional probable cause
may sometimes be necessary under the unreasonable search
and seizure clause.
The balancing test frequently applied under the unreason-
able search and seizure clause makes that provision ideally
suited to authorize defensive use of warrants. Competing pri-
vacy and societal interests are frequently identified, weighed
and balanced under that clause in deciding whether a search
been summarized as follows:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is ani-
mated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or
section should be construed in connection with every other part or section
so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine
interpretation to the one section to be construed.
2A SINGER, supra note 14, § 46.05 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the "whole statute" approach to statu-
tory interpretation also applies to constitutional interpretation. See Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); see also Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819) ("Where words conflict with
each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other,
and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be
varied, construction becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning
of words is justifiable.").
... See United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) ("Though the Fourth Amendment speaks
broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' the definition of 'reasonableness'
turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the Warrant Clause.").
Reliance on the warrant and probable cause requirements to determine reasonable-
ness, is not, hbwever, absolute. As noted by Justice Kennedy,
Tihe Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures,
but only those that are unreasonable. What is reasonable, of course,
"depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure
and the nature of the search or seizure itself." Thus, the permissibility of
a particular practice "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests."
In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the pro-
cedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. . ..
We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however ....




or seizure without probable cause is constitutionally reason-
able.162 For some searches and seizures, an appropriate bal-
ance might only be reached if the unreasonable search and
seizure clause is interpreted to permit the issuance of warrants
without traditional probable cause. Without the ability to
strike this balance, a court is confronted with the either/or
choice of authorizing a search or seizure without a warrant or
not authorizing it all.63 For the reasons previously discussed,
this choice is likely to be resolved by devaluing the importance
of a warrant to authorize the warrantless search or sei-
zure.
164
The issue of whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes
warrants to be used defensively therefore involves a clash
between fundamentally inconsistent interpretations of the
Amendment's two clauses. Imposing a warrant requirement
may be necessary under the unreasonable search and seizure
clause to establish the constitutionality of a search or seizure
undertaken without probable cause, but to do so would violate
the Warrant Clause.
There is no indication that the framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to prohibit a warrant requirement when a
search or seizure otherwise would be constitutionally reason-
able without the Court's definition of traditional probable
cause. 165 Instead, the overriding goal of the Fourth Amend-
ment of protecting privacy by controlling the discretion of exec-
utive officers can be furthered by imposing a warrant require-
ment on this conduct.16 6 If the only way that a search or sei-
162 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
16 See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
16 When searches and seizures are authorized without traditional probable
cause, a warrant requirement can limit discretion and protect privacy from unjusti-
fied and arbitrary governmental interference. For administrative searches, a war-
rant controls discretion by insuring that the decision to invade privacy is under-
taken pursuant to neutral criteria. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30. For
criminal investigatory searches and seizures upon reasonable suspicion, the need
for a warrant requirement may be even more compelling than if the conduct re-
quired probable cause.
Searches and seizures upon reasonable suspicion carry an inherently greater
risk of invading the privacy of an innocent person than if the intrusion required
probable cause. The quality and quantity of the evidence supporting the search in
Griffin, for example, hardly present a compelling justification for searching a
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dwelling. Griffin's home was searched based solely upon a tip from a police detec-
tive to a probation officer "that there were or might be guns in Griffin's apart-
ment." See supra note 63. The tip failed to reveal the source of its information,
and the detective thought most likely to have provided the tip could not recall
doing so. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 887-88 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
If the information supporting the search in Griffin is an example of the type
of evidence that establishes reasonable suspicion, that standard grants substantial
discretion to executive officers in deciding when to invade privacy. This no doubt
led the dissenters to criticize the standard applied in Griffin to uphold the search
as being no standard at all: "The content of a standard is found in its application
and, in this case, I cannot discern the application of any standard whatsoever." Id.
at 887 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). That discretion, in turn, increases the possibility
of arbitrary conduct. Since a relatively low level of suspicion justifies a search or
seizure, police officers have considerable flexibility to act for purposes of harass-
ment or as a pretext for other intrusions that require probable cause.
Imposing a warrant requirement on searches and seizures that require only
reasonable suspicion serves several purposes. First, a warrant narrowly defines the
permissible scope of a search. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927) (purpose of the particularity requirements is to limit discretion of officer
executing the warrant). There is as much need to describe particularly the objects
of a search to control the discretion of the officers searching Griffin's home upon
reasonable suspicion as there would be if the search required probable cause. For
example, assume that Griffin had successfully completed his probationary period
and was suspected of unlawfully possessing a concealable firearm in his house
after having been convicted of a felony. Traditional probable cause would be re-
quired to search, and the search could only be conducted pursuant to a warrant
that particularly described the object of the search. The search of the home of
Griffin, the probationer, involves the same intrusion as the search of Griffin, the
convicted felon. If a warrant requirement is necessary to control the discretion in
one case, it would serve the same purpose in the other. This is not to suggest,
however, that it may not be reasonable to dispense with a warrant requirement
when the home of Griffin the probationer is searched, for that determination
would be based on factors other than the need to control the discretion of the
searching officer.
A judicial warrant requirement also forces the government to establish the
justification for its conduct to a neutral and detached officer before it can invade
privacy. It is unable to rely simply upon the judgment of an officer charged with
enforcing the law who, because of an interest in "making a case," may act hastily
and resolve any doubts about the lawfulness of conduct in the government's favor.
Thus, the warrant requirement helps prevent unjustified searches and seizures. In
doing so, it deters arbitrary conduct.
Arbitrary searches and seizures, which also are often likely to be impulsive,
flourish when a low level of suspicion supports an intrusion without prior judicial
approval. An officer is less likely to act arbitrarily if first required to appear be-
fore a judicial officer and establish the grounds for a search or seizure. See Latta
v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The requirement that an officer
articulate his reasons for making a search before he searches is a substantial
deterrent to impulsive and arbitrary official conduct.") (citation and footnote omit-
ted). Additionally, by making a record of the justification for an intrusion before it
occurs, the warrant process prevents the outcome of a search or seizure from in-
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zure without probable cause can be made reasonable is
through a warrant requirement, the unreasonable search and
seizure clause should be interpreted to authorize a warrant
and trump the prohibition in the Warrant Clause. The War-
rant Clause, designed to control the discretion of executive
officers, should not be applied mechanically to preclude that
control simply because a search or seizure is constitutionally
reasonable without probable cause.
One might respond that the Warrant Clause, as a specific
prohibition, should prevail over a conflicting interpretation
under the general reasonableness inquiry mandated by the
fluencing a subsequent determination of whether it was justified at its inception.
The assumption that search warrants protect privacy interests has been chal-
lenged by Justice Stevens. Emphasizing that a search warrant authorizes forcible
"unannounced, immediate entry and search," Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 513
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring), Justice Stevens has argued that a warrant "is not
simply a device providing procedural protection for the citizen; it also grants the
government increased authority to invade the citizen's privacy." Id. at 514 n.2
(citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323-24 (1971)).
Justice Steven's concern that warranted searches may be more intrusive than
warrantless searches is overstated. Notice must generally be given before a war-
rant is executed and force used. See generally 4A LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 4.8(a)-
(c). Although there are circumstances that justify an unannounced, forcible war-
ranted search, they are the exceptions rather than the rule. Id. 4.8(d)-(g) . More-
over, while there theoretically may be a right to refuse a warrantless search, that
right sometimes carries a price. The regulations authorizing the search in Griffin,
for example, provide that refusal to submit to a search is itself a violation of
probation. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871. Further, the request to conduct a warrantless
search may convey that there is no right to refuse.
Justice Stevens's concern about warranted searches was raised in objecting to
administrative warrants that authorize searches without particularized suspicion.
There is substantial disagreement about whether the probable cause showing for
administrative warrants is effective in protecting privacy interests and, if effective,
whether that protection is outweighed by the societal interest in permitting war-
rantless searches. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. However, criminal
investigatory search warrants are considered so important in protecting privacy
interests that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. See supra
note 15. The same privacy interests can be implicated by a criminal investigatory
search requiring traditional probable cause and a search that is constitutional
upon reasonable suspicion. If a warrant requirement is not to be imposed on a
search requiring only reasonable suspicion, the justification cannot be that it is
ineffective in protecting privacy interests, since it would be presumed effective if
the search required traditional probable cause.
The effectiveness of the warrant process in insuring meaningful review by a
neutral officer is not without its detractors. See, e.g., Steven Duke, Making Leon
Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986); Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the
Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1987); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881 (1991).
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unreasonable search and seizure clause. However, the rule of
construction that "the specific controls the general,"'67 like
any other rule of construction, merely aids interpretation and
does not apply if a contrary intent appears.6 8  The
Amendment's preference for before-the-fact review of the deci-
sion to invade privacy is itself derived from the Warrant
Clause. This "one governing principle"'69 of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence reflects an intent not to preclude the pro-
tection afforded by a warrant requirement merely because a
search or seizure is reasonable without probable cause.17 At
the same time, like the two other interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment discussed in this Article which authorize defensive
use of warrants, the ability to trump the Warrant Clause can
also be applied to erode Fourth Amendment protection.
" It is generally held that a specific enactment addressing an issue should
control over a more general provision. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See generally 2A SINGER, supra note 14, § 51.05.
" 2A SINGER supra note 14, § 51.05 n.3. The so-called "cannons of construc-
tion" are frequently criticized as being contradictory and subject to manipulation.
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950).
" See supra text accompanying note 24.
170 An argument that the prohibition against defensive use of warrants in the
Warrant Clause should prevail over the authorization of such warrants under the
unreasonable search and seizure clause also may incorrectly assume that the for-
mer is more specific than the latter in addressing the constitutionality of defensive
use of warrants. Of course, if something is a "warrant" it must be supported by
something known as "probable cause." What those two terms mean raises as
many, if not more, questions of interpretation as deciding whether imposing a
warrant requirement on a search or seizure that does not require probable cause
is the only way to establish the constitutional reasonableness of that conduct.
The Warrant Clause, because of its emphatic command, initially appears more
specific in prohibiting judicial warrants without traditional probable cause than the
unreasonable search and seizure clause appears in authorizing such warrants.
However, this specificity exists only as a consequence of the Court's interpretation
of the warrant and probable cause requirements to preclude defensive use of war-
rants under the Warrant Clause. The authorization of defensive use of warrants in
the unreasonable search and seizure clause is no less specific than the prohibition
of such warrants in the Warrant Clause, since both are dependent on judicial in-




IV. WEAKENING FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION BY
AUTHORIZING DEFENSIVE USE OF WARRANTS
Although the Fourth Amendment can be interpreted to
authorize defensive use of warrants, there may be significant
costs in doing so. Justice Scalia may have been hinting at this
when he criticized the Griffin dissenters for not considering
the impact of allowing warrants to issue without probable
cause on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'71 Authorizing
warrants to issue without probable cause creates the possibili-
ty that an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment designed to
protect privacy and control discretion will be used to subvert
those interests.
A. Varying the Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements
The discussion to this point envisions that applying
Camara's variable standard of probable cause to all searches
and seizures that are reasonable without traditional probable
cause will result in warrants being used defensively to protect
privacy interests. An expanded application of variable probable
cause, however, can also lead to warrants being used offensive-
ly. Instead of being used to impose a warrant requirement
when searches and seizures are appropriately authorized with-
out traditional probable cause, a variable standard might be
applied to reduce the degree of suspicion for warranted search-
es and seizures that now appropriately require traditional
probable cause.'72
.. See supra text accompanying note 13.
1 For example, in the previously discussed hypothetical of a search of ware-
house for drugs, see supra text accompanying notes 40-41, a search might be au-
thorized upon a degree of particularized suspicion that is less than that now re-
quired to establish traditional probable cause.
A second concern raised by a variable standard of probable cause concerns its
effect on the administration of justice. Under a variable standard, a multitude of
levels of particularized suspicion could support different categories of intrusions,
transforming the Amendment "into one immense Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, su-
pra note 40, at 393. A sliding scale of suspicion Professor Amsterdam notes, "could
achieve the infinitely sensible result that two-minute street detentions are allow-
able upon a 37 percent probability of criminality, four-minute street detentions are
allowable upon a 39 percent probability of criminality, and so on." Id. at 376. But
such fine distinctions would be accomplished at the cost of making the Amend-
ment far more difficult to interpret and apply. Id. at 394-75.
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Variable probable cause may also lower the standard of
suspicion for warrantless searches and seizures. In this in-
stance, however, variable probable cause does not create new
authority to sanction warrantless conduct without traditional
probable cause; the conduct can already be authorized under
the unreasonable search and seizure clause. Variable probable
cause, however, could prompt the Court to reexamine cases
imposing a traditional probable cause standard on broad cate-
gories of warrantless searches and seizures and potentially
result in a lowering of the required degree of particularized
suspicion for some of that conduct.'73
Similarly, interpreting the unreasonable search and sei-
zure clause to allow non-traditional warrants to issue without
probable cause risks eroding Fourth Amendment protection.
Existing administrative search doctrine limits judicially autho-
rized searches without traditional probable cause to a narrow
category of searches in which a non-traditional warrant re-
quirement protects privacy interests. But if a non-traditional
warrant requirement is authorized for all searches and sei-
zures, it could lead to a reduction of the degree of suspicion
required for some judicially authorized criminal, investigatory
This is a significant but not fatal concern. Although the Court has stressed
the importance of a "single uniform standard" of probable cause for criminal inves-
tigatory conduct, see supra note 45, it has not defined that standard in a manner
that is particularly illuminating to those charged with enforcing and interpreting
the criminal law. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93. Applying a variable
standard to all searches and seizures may force the Court to define the quantum
of required suspicion for general categories of searches and seizures more precisely.
Additionally, while a variable standard theoretically can lead to the fine gradations
of suspicion hypothesized by Professor Amsterdam, the Court is unlikely to apply
variable probable cause in that manner. Instead, variable probable cause could
lead to the creation of a handful of levels of suspicion that may be easier to apply
than the current amorphous standard. Cf. People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352
N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976) (establishing four levels of suspicion for po-
lice-citizen encounters: "request for information," "common-law right of inquiry,"
reasonable suspicion and probable cause). But cf. Emily J. Sack, Note, Police Ap-
proaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of People v. De
Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512, 533 (1991) (arguing that instead of providing guid-
ance, De Bour has caused confusion at all levels of the criminal justice system).
173 For example, under the current approach to defining probable cause, it is
unlikely that the Court would reexamine the rule that warrantless arrests must
be supported by traditional probable cause. Adoption of a variable standard, how-
ever, with its emphasis on the flexibility of the standard to respond to a variety
of competing interests, might result in the Court lowering the degree of suspicion
required for some arrests.
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searches and seizures. 174
Moreover, the current Supreme Court is likely to apply a
non-traditional warrant requirement to authorize offensive
rather than defensive use of warrants. Consider, for example,
the search in Griffin. Applying variable probable cause to that
search does nothing to control discretion or protect privacy
since a majority of the Court held that the warrantless search
was constitutional upon reasonable suspicion.'75 On the other
hand, a variable standard of probable cause might be applied
to the previously discussed hypothetical of a search of a ware-
house for drugs'76 and authorize a search warrant without
traditional probable cause. Similarly, the Court is unlikely to
hold that the seizure and detention of Onyema requires judi-
cial authorization. 7 7 It is by far easier, for example, to envi-
sion the current Court upholding a non-traditional warrant
that authorizes, upon reasonable suspicion, a brief entry into a
suspected drug dealer's house to seize contraband in plain view
and then allowing that evidence to be used to obtain a tradi-
tional warrant for a more thorough search. 7'
"" Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984) (Court notes but
reserves ruling on government's argument that reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause should be the standard if a warrant requirement applies to moni-
toring an electronic beeper in the home).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
178 See supra notes 4041 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 127.
178 Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (illegal warrantless entry to
secure premises pending issuance of search warrant does not require suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to that warrant even if defendants could establish that
the evidence would have been destroyed but for the illegal entry).
The fear that non-traditional warrants could lead to a reduction of the degree
of suspicion required for judicially authorized searches and seizures could be ad-
dressed if a non-traditional warrant requirement is limited to "non-traditional"
searches and seizures such as the electronic monitoring challenged in Karo, see
supra note 174, or the seizures in Hayes and Davis. This approach could prevent
erosion of the probable cause requirement for searches and seizures that have
previously required a warrant supported by probable cause, such as a search of a
dwelling for criminal evidence or an arrest inside the suspect's house.
There are two problems, however, with an attempt to limit the scope of a
non-traditional warrant requirement. The first is that the limitation still allows a
reduced level of suspicion for judicially authorized, non-traditional criminal investi-
gatory searches and seizures that might have required a warrant supported by
probable cause in the absence of a non-traditional warrant requirement. The sec-
ond is that the difference between "traditional" and "non-traditional" searches and
seizures is not always an easy one to make. Consider, for example, the hypotheti-
cal envisioned in the accompanying text. Is the police conduct in that case a tradi-
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B. Trumping the Warrant Clause
Allowing the unreasonable search and seizure clause to
trump the Warrant Clause and to authorize defensive use of
warrants also risks diminishing Fourth Amendment protection.
Since this approach would allow a search warrant to issue in
Griffin upon reasonable suspicion, might not other provisions
of the Warrant Clause also be trumped in other cases? For
example, could the particularity requirement be ignored for
some purely criminal investigatory searches?
It might be argued that this fear is overstated since the
interpretation envisioned here permits trumping the Warrant
Clause only to further the Amendment's purpose of controlling
discretion and protecting privacy. Authorizing a criminal in-
vestigatory search warrant upon probable cause, but allowing
an officer to decide where to search would not only violate the
express language of the Warrant Clause, but would also be di-
rectly contrary to the Amendment's purpose. Under such cir-
cumstances the unreasonable search and seizure clause should
not override the Warrant Clause. On the other hand, allowing
warrants to issue without probable cause is not done solely to
protect privacy interests; that goal could be accomplished sim-
ply by prohibiting a search or seizure undertaken without
probable cause. Allowing the unreasonable search and seizure
clause to trump the Warrant Clause instead reflects the con-
clusion that an appropriate balance between competing privacy
and societal interests can sometimes be reached only by autho-
rizing searches and seizures without traditional probable cause
but requiring advance judicial approval.
The same balancing approach that could support a war-
rant requirement without traditional probable cause in Hayes
and Davis therefore also might be applied to searches and
seizures currently requiring traditional probable cause and a
warrant. An "area-wide" warrant, for example, might authorize
the search of all houses in a neighborhood known for a high
incidence of drug trafficking.179 The absence of particularized
tional search because it involves entry into the home to find criminal evidence, or
is it a non-traditional search because the scope of the officer's authority is limited
to the seizure of evidence in plain view?
' Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (police enter over 300
buildings, mostly dwellings, looking for murder suspect and are enjoined from
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suspicion and traditional probable cause would not preclude
authorizing the warranted search under the unreasonable
search and seizure clause which, under the approach discussed
here, would reign supreme and trump the prohibition in the
Warrant Clause. Thus, analysis under the unreasonable search
and seizure clause, which repeatedly has been criticized for
diminishing the importance of the warrant and probable cause
requirements, 8 ' could now be applied with a vengeance to re-
duce the degree of suspicion for warranted searches and sei-
zures that now require traditional probable cause.
CONCLUSION
Both Justice Scalia and the Griffin dissenters fail to con-
sider the implications of interpreting the Fourth Amendment
to authorize warrants without probable cause. Justice Scalia
avoids this issue by relying upon the supposed plain meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Griffin dissenters correctly
assume that the text of the Amendment is not self-defining,
but fail to explain how the text can be interpreted to authorize
the warrant they envision.
This Article has explored three interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment that authorize a warrant requirement for
searches and seizures that are constitutionally reasonable
without probable cause: variable probable cause, a non-tradi-
tional warrant requirement and trumping the Warrant Clause.
It is unlikely, however, that the current Supreme Court would
adopt any of the three as each relies upon the importance of a
warrant requirement in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a
doctrine to which the Court routinely gives lip service, but
then generally ignores.' 8 ' Moreover, even if the Court were to
interpret the Fourth Amendment to authorize defensive use of
warrants for criminal investigatory searches and seizures,
there is reason to fear that it would apply that interpretation
searching without probable cause).
18' See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
181 Bookspan, supra note 54, at 501 (although the Court frequently states its
preference for a warrant requirement, it is generally agreed that "[plerhaps no
more frequently quoted statement is less true."); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("the 'warrant requirement' hals] become
so riddled with exceptions that. it [is] basically unrecognizable.")
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to weaken, rather then strengthen, Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. In this regard, Justice Scalia's comment that the Griffin
dissenters have not considered the impact of warrants without
probable cause on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 2 seems
more of a threat than a benign observation.
One might reluctantly conclude, therefore, that Justice
Scalia's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, although not
compelled by its text or the Court's jurisprudence, ultimately
offers greater protection of Fourth Amendment values than
any of the three interpretations discussed in this Article. On
the other hand, Justice Scalia's approach will likely lead to
continued devaluation of the importance of warrants and to
increased authorization of warrantless searches and seizures
without traditional probable cause. But this result seems no
worse than adopting an interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment designed to further its underlying purpose which, in
practice, is more likely be applied to subvert that purpose.
Justice Scalia's approach is also likely to lead to the overruling
of Camara's variable standard of probable cause. But the bene-
fits of imposing a warrant requirement in administrative
search cases seem relatively insignificant when compared to
the potential erosion of Fourth Amendment values that can
result from the Court's ability to authorize offensive use of
warrants in criminal cases.
Nevertheless, the fear that an interpretation of the
Amendment that authorizes defensive use of warrants will be
used to weaken Fourth Amendment protection does not nec-
essarily establish the case against that interpretation. If the
Court cannot be trusted in applying any of the three approach-
es for authorizing defensive use of warrants consistently with
Fourth Amendment values, any attempt to limit its interpie-
tive options will likewise be ineffective in preventing the con-
tinuing erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
" See supra text accompanying note 13.
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